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Preface
For the past 15 years, the RAND Corporation’s Drug Policy Research Center (DPRC) has been 
analyzing trends in drug use and consequences in the United States and evaluating policies in-
tended to respond to drug-related problems. Focus is essential if research is to be successful, so 
each of our eﬀorts to date has necessarily addressed only aspects, often fairly narrow aspects,   
of the drug problem and policy spectrum. We thought it might be helpful to policymakers and 
the general public if we stood back, took a broader view, and attempted to synthesize some of 
the ﬁndings of our own research and that of others. It seemed to us that there might be some 
interest in a concise, accessible, objective view of where the United States has been, now stands, 
and is going in its long “war on drugs.” We are not the ﬁrst to attempt such a synthesis, but 
other volumes have been lengthy or written to support a certain policy agenda (typically either 
the prevailing government policy or a dramatically diﬀering alternative).
We begin by assessing the success of drug policies to date and then review possible reasons 
why they have not been more successful. We consider the drug war’s “collateral damage” and 
attempt to understand why alternative policies have not been tried. Finally, we lay out some 
possible futures for drug problems and policy in the United States and infer from our review 
of evidence some broad suggestions for a healthier policy mix and debate.
We cannot, of course, be encyclopedic in a small space; various interesting topics and 
perspectives must be omitted. While we have tried to account for diﬀerent viewpoints, this 
review inevitably reﬂects the particular analytic interests of the DPRC. For those interested in 
learning more, we append a list of books that go into more detail but that should still be acces-
sible to the educated layperson.
Footnotes to the text provide sources for the factual statements made and for some of the 
hypotheses and arguments where these have been previously set out in a compelling fashion, as 
well as technical elaboration on some of the text points. We do not attempt a comprehensive iv    How Goes the War on Drugs?
list of sources for each point and, in being selective, we sometimes list a recent, readily available 
source rather than an original one.
To enhance readability of the text, references in the text are given only at the ends of para-
graphs. Where a source applies only to a speciﬁc point within the paragraph (as is typically the 
case), that is so indicated in the footnote. Sources for statements repeated in the text are not 
repeated. Most citations are abbreviated; for the full citation, see the reference list at the end. 
The preparation of this Occasional Paper was supported by core DPRC funds provided by The 
Ford Foundation. The DPRC is coadministered by two research units of the RAND Corpora-
tion, RAND Health and RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment (ISE).v
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Illegal drugs are a $60-billion-per-year industry patronized by at least 16 million Americans, 7 
percent of the U.S. population over the age of 12. This level of usage clearly worries the rest of 
the population: From 1985 until 2001, “drugs” was consistently 1 of the top 10 answers when 
Americans were asked what they thought was the most important problem facing the nation.1
In response to such concerns, federal and state legislators and executive-branch oﬃcials have 
enacted and implemented policies that, while diverse in approach, are oriented toward enforce-
ment. These policies include the prohibition of almost any use or possession of cocaine, heroin, 
marijuana, and a wide variety of other psychoactive substances. To make it more diﬃcult to buy 
such drugs, strategies have been implemented that range from eradication of crops like coca in 
source countries, through interdiction of smugglers, to disruption of street markets and incar-
ceration of dealers within U.S. borders. At the same time, governmental agencies have sought to 
reduce Americans’ demand for drugs through treatment of substance abusers and prevention pro-
grams oﬀered through schools and over the media. However, most expenditures on drug control 
at federal, state, and local levels combined have been directed to enforcement.2
Over the past 15 years, these measures have had a dramatic impact on some segments of 
society. They have not, however, led to substantial decreases in the severity of America’s drug-
1 Use data are for any illicit drug in the 30 days prior to survey, from pp. 21–22 of “Data Supplement” (available only online 
at  http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs03/drug_related_data.pdf),  The White  House,  National 
Drug Control Strategy, Oﬃce of National Drug Control Policy, Washington, D.C., February 2003, citing Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. The survey, renamed the National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health in 2002, annually measures the prevalence of drug and alcohol use among household members 
aged 12 and over; because it undersamples the homeless and ignores the institutionalized, it misses many frequent users of 
expensive and addictive drugs. Because of that and because it relies on self-reports of illegal activity, its estimates are known to 
be conservative (see Manski, Pepper, and Petrie, eds., Informing America’s Policy on Illegal Drugs, pp. 78–79, 87–88). Polling 
data from various organizations, 1985–2002, are from the LexisNexis Web site, reported by the Roper Center at the University 
of Connecticut, “Public Opinion Online.”
2 MacCoun and Reuter, Drug War Heresies, Chapter 2.2    How Goes the War on Drugs?
related problems, prompting strident denunciations of current policy. Many critics argue that 
the increased toughness of that policy has done more harm than good. Some go so far as to sug-
gest that drugs should simply be legalized. Such attacks have induced equally strong defenses of 
current policy by enforcement proponents, who believe that failure of the patient to improve 
is an indicator that even stronger medicine is required. They also fear that watering down the 
regimen will surrender what gains have been made to date.3
Evidence is typically lost in this debate. What evidence makes its way to the surface is 
often cited selectively to make a case for a preferred position. Here, we attempt to sort through 
and weigh the evidence to see where it takes us and what kind of story it tells about updated 
progress and options for the future in the “war on drugs.”4
Evidence is not the whole story, of course. Evidence has little bearing on the kind of moral 
beliefs many people hold: that the use of psychoactive drugs is wrong, and their sale more 
wrong; or that government intrusion into the drug use decision is wrong, and harsh sanctions 
against possession are also wrong. While we acknowledge such concerns, particularly as they 
play out in the political arena, empirical evidence per se can shed no light on them. However, 
the evidence should be of interest even to those primarily motivated by morality and a sense 
of justice. After all, moral concerns can conﬂict, and the evidence may suggest unintended 
consequences of morally driven decisions.5
In this paper, we are interested primarily in choices at the strategic level—choices, for exam-
ple, among strict prohibition, moderate prohibition, or decriminalization; choices among goals, 
for example, those focusing on use reduction or those focusing on harm reduction; decisions as 
to the appropriate roles of supply and demand control. We do not try to deal with questions of 
how a strategy is to be implemented once it has been selected. These include issues such as how 
to design a prevention or treatment intervention or whether treatment program A is better than 
program B. There is no question that such issues are very important, because there is enormous 
variation in eﬀectiveness across programs and, hence, enormous potential for a good strategy to 
get undermined by poor tactics and implementation. The focus here, however, is on information 
that will give readers a better understanding of big-picture, strategic themes.6
3 For societal impacts, see “What about Bonuses and Collateral Damage?” below. For trends in drug-related problems, see 
“Has the War Achieved Its Goals?” below. On drug legalization, see, for example, Cussen and Block, “Legalize Drugs Now!: 
An Analysis of the Beneﬁts of Legalized Drugs.”
4 An example of selective citation is the assertion by Cussen and Block in “Legalize Drugs Now!” that drug quantities con-
sumed do not respond much to price changes, which ignores evidence to the contrary; see, for example, Caulkins et al., Man-
datory Minimum Drug Sentences, pp. 84–85.
5 On morality as an evidence-discouraging factor, see Reuter, “Why Does Research Have So Little Impact on American Drug 
Policy?”
6 On variation in treatment program eﬀectiveness, see Duhamel, “Drug Use Outcomes in Four Substance Abuse Treatment 
Studies,” citing Dean Gerstein and Robert Johnson, Prospective and Retrospective Studies of Substance Abuse Treatment Out-
comes: Methods and Results of Four Large-Scale Follow-Up Programs, National Evaluation Data Services, 1999; however, see 
caution in Chapter Three, Note 4. On variation in prevention program eﬀectiveness, see Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug 
Prevention, pp. 61–62.3
CHAPTER TWO
How Successful Has the War on Drugs Been?
The ﬁrst response to this question ought not to be an answer but another question: Successful 
at achieving what goals? What is the drug war supposed to be accomplishing?
Before answering this question, we should make three points. First, drug control rhetoric 
has sometimes included references to a “drug-free society.” By this standard, of course, U.S. 
policy on drugs has been a failure and so will always be. No modern democratic state has been 
drug-free, and America will not be the ﬁrst. Thus, it is not reasonable to require that the war on 
drugs eliminate drug use to be regarded as successful. (Whether the drug-free society has rhe-
torical value as an idealistic goal is another matter. It could be argued that if the goal were not 
so ambitious, the campaign would achieve even less. Conversely, unrealistic goals may serve as 
the rationale for policies that will then also fail at achieving more practical objectives.)1
Second, “war” is not an apt metaphor when identiﬁed with policy seeking to control drug 
use. We use it here because it still enjoys some currency in the popular press and it is a conve-
nient way of referring to the prevailing set of policies emphasizing enforcement. However, the 
campaign against drugs includes the expenditure of substantial sums on such non-war-like ac-
tivities as drug abuse treatment and prevention. Thus, the “drug war” metaphor has fallen out 
of favor even among those most comfortable with the current enforcement-focused approach. 
Our use of the term is for convenience and should be understood in this context.
Third, America’s drug use problem extends beyond drugs whose use by almost anyone is 
illegal, for example, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Adult abuse of alcohol, underage use of 
alcohol and tobacco, and illicit use of prescription drugs all carry addiction risk and burden 
1 Examples of recent references to freedom from drugs include Pres. William J. Clinton, “ … move us closer to a drug-free 
America,” from The White House, “The President’s Message,” The National Drug Control Strategy: 1999, p. iii; Pres. George W. 
Bush, “ … setting our Nation on the road to a drug-free society,” from President, Proclamation, “Proclamation 7470—Fam-
ily Day, 2001,” p. 1370; and Sen. Patrick Leahy, “ … our shared goal of a drug-free America,” Congressional Record—Senate, 
December 5, 2001.4    How Goes the War on Drugs?
society with economic and health costs. In fact, it has been estimated that the costs of tobacco 
use alone exceed those of all the illegal drugs combined. However, “drugs” as a social problem 
and the “war on drugs” as a solution are both typically interpreted as applying only to the 
generally illegal drugs. In fact, the current use reduction goals of the national drug strategy 
explicitly exclude adolescent alcohol and tobacco use. Therefore, we restrict ourselves here to 
drugs whose use is inherently illicit in the United States.2
What Have the Goals Been?
The goals of national drug control strategy have varied to a minor extent, since the ﬁrst annual 
strategy volume was issued in 1989. That initial version focused on reducing the overall level 
of drug use, as well as reducing initiation and use at every level of intensity from that of casual 
users to that of addicts. Other oﬃcial objectives included reductions in hospital emergency de-
partment mentions of drug-associated admissions (a measure of harm to users); in the import, 
availability, and domestic production of drugs; and in adolescents’ approval of drug use.3
Over the course of the 1990s, the goals were simpliﬁed to the reduction of drug use and 
drug-related consequences. The current administration’s strategy places the emphasis on measures 
of use alone. It sets two two-year goals: a 10 percent reduction in current use by adolescents 
(relative to use in 2000–2001) and the same for adults (relative to use in 2002). Two analogous 
ﬁve-year goals seek 25 percent reductions. “Current use” means the percentage of the population 
reporting any use of an illicit drug within the previous month, as documented by the Monitoring 
the Future survey (for adolescents) and the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (for adults). 
The two-year 10-percent goals match those of the original 1989 strategy, while the ﬁve-year 25-
percent goals replace the 10-year 25-percent goals of the original strategy. The current strategy 
also characterizes education, treatment, and market disruption as national priorities.4
The current national drug control strategy appears motivated by a desire to reduce the 
adverse consequences of drug use. However, there are no explicit goals associated with reducing 
such important consequences as overdoses, lost productivity, and HIV infection. This partly 
reﬂects the diﬃculty in accounting for progress against broader objectives. There are few drug-
related outcomes for which even moderately plausible measures are available. For example, 
there has never been a credible estimate of U.S. marijuana production, and estimates of the 
number of persons addicted to heroin or cocaine have been subject to large revisions every two 
or three years. The percentage of individuals (addicted or not) recently using any drug is one 
of the very few transparent and moderately credible measures available.5
2 Comparative social cost estimates are based on results given by Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug Prevention, p. 21. Current 
national strategy is from The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, February 2003, p. 4.
3 The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, February 1989, pp. 94–97.
4 The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, March 2004, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs04/intro.html.
5 A consequence-oriented motivation for the national strategy can be inferred from passages in The White House, “Healing 
America’s Drug Users: Getting Treatment Resources Where They Are Needed,” National Drug Control Strategy, March 2004,How Successful Has the War on Drugs Been?    5
The national strategy’s hopes for consequence reduction thus rest on the reasonable ex-
pectation that lower use will lead to fewer adverse consequences. However, most persons re-
sponding “yes” to questions about current use are light users, whereas adverse consequences 
are more closely associated with heavy use. Thus, progress measured toward a use reduction 
goal will not necessarily reﬂect progress toward consequence reduction. Reduction of casual 
marijuana use by a certain percentage will not reduce drug use consequences nearly as much as 
reduction of heavy cocaine use by the same percentage. A consequence reduction goal might 
thus imply an allocation of control eﬀort (e.g., a cocaine focus) diﬀering from that implied by 
use reduction (e.g., a marijuana focus, because there are so many more marijuana users than 
cocaine users).6
Has the War Achieved Its Goals?
Measured against its goals, early and more recent, the drug war has had a mixed record, at 
least superﬁcially. The percentage of the population reporting past-month use of some illicit 
drug declined by half between 1985 and 1992. While drug use by that measure is up by about 
a third since then, meaningful decreases in the number of cocaine users continued through 
the mid-1990s (see Figure 2.1). Since 1990 the number of frequent users of cocaine (and of 
heroin) has declined modestly, according to oﬃcial estimates. Such trends might be read as 
reﬂecting success in getting users to quit or in keeping prospective users from starting, or both. 
However, keeping kids from starting drugs is separately measured, and initiation of marijuana, 
cocaine, and hallucinogens went up in the 1990s and has stayed there. Furthermore, current 
use of marijuana by teenagers increased substantially in the mid- to late 1990s (see Figure 2.2); 
in 2003, 21 percent of 12th-graders reported having used marijuana or hashish within the 
previous month. And total drug consumption does not always follow the number of users. In 
the 1980s, for example, the number of cocaine users fell, but the quantity consumed stayed the 
same, as heavy users accounted for a larger fraction of the user population. Not coincidentally, 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs04/healing_amer.html. Regarding the volatility of addiction 
estimates, in 2000 the Oﬃce of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimated that in 1997 there were 3.5 million 
chronic cocaine users; one year later the estimate for 1997 was revised to 2.85 million. In the same reports the number of 
chronic heroin users for 1992 was revised upward from 630,000 to 955,000. Data are from Abt Associates, Inc., (Rhodes, 
Layne, Johnston, and Hozik), What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988–1998, December 2000, p. 10, and Abt As-
sociates, Inc., What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988–2000, December 2001, p. 9.
6 According to SAMHSA, National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2003, 75 percent of household members using 
cocaine within the past year used it fewer than 50 times, for an average of once a week. Users of other drugs followed suit: 
most reported using fewer than 50 times. National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) data are at http://oas.samhsa.
gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/Sect7peTabs1to12.pdf. We call use rates less frequent than once a week “light use” in accordance 
with Everingham and Rydell, Modeling the Demand for Cocaine, p. 14. As to the preponderance of heavy use in giving rise to 
adverse consequences, we rely on the proportionality of social costs to grams of drug consumed, and on the preponderance 
of heavy use in grams consumed. The ﬁrst is from Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug Prevention, pp. 19–21, the second from 
Everingham and Rydell, Modeling the Demand for Cocaine, pp. 47–49, who show that in 1992, when light users were over 
75 percent of all cocaine users, heavy users accounted for most of the consumption. Variations in the consequences of light 
marijuana versus heavy cocaine use are from Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug Prevention, p. 21.6    How Goes the War on Drugs?
Figure 2.1
Use of Marijuana and Cocaine Have Fallen in the Past 20 Years
SOURCE: Data are from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAHMSA), National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, and SAMHSA, “2003 National Survey 
on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables,” Table 1.3B, http://oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/Sect1peTabs1to18.
pdf. Data for 1975, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1989 are interpolated. Data after 1999 are not 
strictly comparable to those from earlier years because of technical changes in survey method.
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Figure 2.2
Use of Marijuana by High School Seniors Has Increased
SOURCE: Data are from “Monitoring the Future: 2003 Data from In-School Surveys of 8th-, 10th, and 12th-Grade 
Students,”  http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/data/03data.html#2003data-drugs,  Tables  6  and  7  (“Long-Term 
Trends”). Monitoring the Future, administered by the University of Michigan, annually examines drug-related issues, 
including recency of drug use, perceived harmfulness of drugs, disapproval of drug use, and perceived availability of 
drugs among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders (see p. 5 of “Data Supplement” to National Drug Control Strategy, 2003); 
again, self-reports of illegal activity and omission of a potential high-use group (in this case, drop-outs) bias the 
estimates toward conservatism (see Manski, Pepper, and Petrie, Informing America’s Policy on Illegal Drugs, pp. 79, 
82–84, 87–88).
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ill eﬀects on users, as indicated by drug-related ER admissions, were either steady or rising (see 
Figure 2.3).7
Further indicators of the eﬀectiveness (or lack thereof) of the prevailing policy can be 
found in measures associated with the drug supply pipeline and markets. Some such measures, 
such as the amount of drugs seized, are too gross to be meaningful. If more drugs are seized 
this year than last year, does that mean that more drugs are being removed from U.S. streets 
or that more drugs are being sent? Measures of drug prices (and availability on the street) are 
more helpful. That is because a principal objective of drug control is to constrain supply suf-
ﬁciently to reduce availability and drive up price, making drug use less attractive. The price 
record suggests that supply control eﬀorts have failed to much reduce the use of any established 
drug. Retail cocaine prices have from time to time been responsive to more intensiﬁed eﬀorts 
to interdict smugglers, but they have soon fallen again, presumably because smugglers have 
discovered new routes or other ways to circumvent interdiction. The overall trend in cocaine 
and heroin retail prices during most of the past two decades has been downward (after adjust-
ing for potency). That suggests greater availability of drugs on the street in the United States, 
not less. Greater availability and lower price are likely to have made use cheaper and more 
attractive, thus taking some of the pressure oﬀ users to quit or scale back and making it easier 
for youths to initiate. Nonetheless, estimated cocaine consumption has fallen in recent years, 
while heroin consumption may have risen. At the same time, no fourth drug has yet grown in 
consequence and popularity to join the “big three” of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Every 
year or two a new drug threatens to be the “new crack,” and methamphetamines may indeed 
grow to become one of the “big four,” but the vast majority of the scores of illicit drugs have 
a very small market share. It has been estimated that in 1999, Americans spent $36 billion on 
cocaine, $11 billion on heroin, $10 billion on marijuana, $5.8 billion on methamphetamines, 
and $2.6 billion on all other illegal drugs combined (see Figure 2.4).8 
7 Percentages reporting past-month use of any illicit drug are from p. 21 of “Data Supplement” to The White House, National 
Drug Control Strategy, 2003, citing National Institute for Drug Abuse (NIDA) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA), National Household Survey on Drug Abuse; number of frequent users is from “Data 
Supplement,” The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, Table 3; adolescent initiation rates are from Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration, Oﬃce of Applied Studies, 2003 National Survey on Drug Use & Health: Detailed 
Tables, http://oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/Sect4peTabs1to14.pdf, Tables 4.1A, 4.2A, and 4.5A; 12th-grader mari-
juana or hashish use is from “Monitoring the Future: 2003 Data from In-School Surveys of 8th-, 10th-, and 12th-Grade Stu-
dents,” http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/data/03data.html#2003data-drugs, Table 2. Total cocaine consumption trend is 
from Everingham and Rydell, Modeling the Demand for Cocaine, p. 49. Emergency department mentions are from NIDA and 
SAMHSA, Drug Abuse Warning Network, 2002.
8 For more on enforcement’s eﬀect on the market, see Rydell and Everingham, Controlling Cocaine pp. 9–15, and The White 
House, National Drug Control Strategy, February 2002, p. 21. For a study favoring the eﬀect of interdiction on cocaine prices, 
see Crane, Rivolo, and Comfort, An Empirical Examination of Counterdrug Interdiction Program Eﬀectiveness, pp. IV-1 to IV-7. 
For smuggler adaptation, see Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, Sealing the Borders: The Eﬀects of Increased Military Participation 
in Drug Intervention, pp. 33–35. Overall price trends are from Caulkins, “Measurement and Analysis of Drug Problems and 
Drug Control Eﬀorts,” in David Duﬀee, ed., Measurement and Analysis of Crime and Justice, pp. 391–449. Cocaine and heroin 
consumption and total expenditures on drugs are from Abt Associates, Inc., What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 
1988–2000, pp. 19 and 31.8    How Goes the War on Drugs?
Figure 2.3
ER Mentions Have Been Increasing   
SOURCE: Data are from NIDA and SAMHSA, Drug Abuse Warning Network, for example, “Emergency Department 
Trends from DAWN,” Table 2.1.0, at http://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs_94_02/edpubs/2002ﬁnal/#publishedtables. Data 
from 1994 on have been recalculated by SAMHSA and are not strictly comparable with earlier numbers (according to   
p. 42 of “Data Supplement” to National Drug Control Strategy, 2003). The Drug Abuse Warning Network provides data 
from medical examiners on drug-related deaths and from hospital emergency departments on drug-related episodes 
by type of drug, reason for taking it, demographic characteristics of the user, and metropolitan area. (See p. 8 of “Data 
Supplement.”) 
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What Other Factors Need to Be Taken into Account?
We said that superﬁcially, the drug war’s record has been mixed. We say superﬁcially because so far, 
we have been discussing drug use and eﬀect trends as if the only thing that inﬂuenced them were How Successful Has the War on Drugs Been?    9
government control policy. Actually, drug prices and demand vary over time in response to numer-
ous factors unrelated to government action, just as the price of, and demand for, other goods vary. 
For example, national trends in the use of any drug are an aggregation of individual use patterns, 
which are inﬂuenced by a panoply of social, cultural, and biological factors. The superﬁcial record 
of drug problem indicators might thus understate (or overstate) the eﬀectiveness of government 
policy, depending on trends in individual preferences and the social and cultural context.
The following pages address some of the factors that make it imprudent to assume that 
trends in drug problems one way or the other reﬂect solely the eﬀectiveness or ineﬀectiveness 
of government policy. We describe the patterns into which individual use falls and the national 
drug epidemics into which individual use “careers” aggregate. We also attempt to aﬀord some 
perspective on the relatively narrow scope of recent U.S. drug problems and policy by brieﬂy 
summarizing some broader geographic and historical variations.
“Careers” of Individual Users 
Most users of any drug begin using it in their teen or young adult years. The single most impor-
tant factor promoting drug use is whether family or friends engage in it. People are not, of course, 
slaves to their acquaintances. They may have an underlying predilection, possibly a genetic one, 
toward drug use or not, and they have an ability to “say no,” although some people are more sug-
gestible than others. Nonetheless, social contacts play a key role in the initiation of drug use.9
The course of drug use plays out diﬀerently in diﬀerent people. Most people who try any 
drug, even heroin, use it only experimentally or continue use moderately and without ill eﬀect. 
The problem (among others) with drug use is not that it will inevitably lead to addiction but 
that it can lead to addiction. Some fraction of people who begin using any drug move on to 
heavy use of that drug, with all the ill consequences speciﬁc to that drug that heavy use entails. 
How big a fraction of experimenters or casual users become heavy users? It has been estimated 
that 23 percent of those who try heroin, 17 percent of those who try cocaine, and 9 percent of 
those who try marijuana become clinically dependent on the drug (the rates for tobacco and 
alcohol are 32 percent and 15 percent, respectively).10
It is the heavy users that represent a true burden on society, because, while heavy users are 
only a minority of those who ever try a drug, their “use careers” last longer. Thus, heavy users 
represent a larger fraction of those using a drug at any given time than of those who ever try it. 
And because they use at higher rates, heavy users represent a larger fraction of total consump-
tion. In fact, the average heavy user of cocaine uses 25 times as much of the drug in his or her 
lifetime as the average person who consumes cocaine for some period of time but never turns 
to heavy use. Heavy users’ higher consumption levels also make them more liable to require 
9 The NSDUH asks current and former drug users their age of initiation, allowing derivation of a mean age of initiation for 
each year back into the 1960s. For the 1970s and 1980s, that mean ranged as follows: marijuana, 18 to 19; cocaine, 19 to 23; 
heroin, 19 to 25; hallucinogens, 18 to 20; methamphetamines, 18 to 22. Data are from Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, Oﬃce of Applied Studies, 2003 National Survey on Drug Use & Health: Detailed Tables, http://oas.
samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/Sect4peTabs1to14.pdf, Tables 4.1A, 4.2A, 4.4A, 4.5A, and 4.13A, citing the 2002 and 2003 
NSDUHs. We omit the 1990s because younger respondents could not have initiated as older adults during those years, thus 
biasing the means downwards. “The single most important factor” is from Botvin, “Principles of Prevention.” On the role of 
genes in drug use, see Vanyukov and Tarter, “Genetic Studies of Substance Abuse.”
10 Clinical dependence rates are from Anthony, Warner, and Kessler, “Comparative Epidemiology of Dependence on Tobacco, 
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health care and more likely to turn to crime to support their habit. They are the primary source 
of drug market revenues, which themselves constitute a social problem. Most drug-related 
violence is the result of attempts to control the wealth ﬂowing through the cocaine and heroin 
markets—wealth that attracts young people to criminal careers. It has been estimated, for   
example, that almost two-thirds of the drug-related homicides in the United States are market-
related, as opposed to murders committed “under the inﬂuence” or for the purpose of support-
ing the killer’s drug habit, as during a robbery.11
For some consumers, heavy use is the ﬁnal resting place, literally: many heroin users con-
tinue use until their (often early) death. A long-term study of heroin addicts found that, after 33 
years, 11 percent of the original subjects had died of a drug overdose, 7 percent of chronic liver 
disease, and 10 percent from homicides, suicides, or accidents. Altogether, 49 percent of the orig-
inal sample had died after 33 years (their average age at the start of the study was 25). Of those 
interviewed at 33 years (42 percent of the original sample), fewer than half had been abstinent 
for more than 5 years; 27 percent of those not in prison and willing to be tested showed positive 
urinalyses at the time. The average reported heroin-using career was 30 years.12
It is thus important in interpreting drug use data to keep in mind that people start using 
drugs and (some heroin users excepted) stop doing so, with varying lengths and intensities of use 
in between. These behaviors may be heavily, partly, or not at all inﬂuenced by government policy.
Just as there is a risk that a casual drug user will become addicted, so is there a risk that a 
tobacco or alcohol user will become a marijuana user. Marijuana users run a risk of moving on 
to one of the expensive drugs like cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamines. Again, while there is 
a risk, this does not typically happen (and the relationship is not necessarily causal, a point we 
will take up shortly). Many of those who do start using a new drug do so without abandoning 
their previous one. Heavy users are thus often polydrug users.13
The drug to which a user turns next can be inﬂuenced by price, and prices, as we have seen, 
can move independently of government action. But a falling price for one drug does not mean 
that users will switch to that drug and quit using another. They could use more of both, if the 
11 As of 1992, the annual exit rates from light cocaine use were estimated at 0.15 to nonuse and 0.024 to heavy use, implying 
a use career of 1/(0.15 + 0.024) or 5.75 years. The exit rates from heavy use were estimated at 0.04 to light use and 0.02 to 
nonuse, implying a use career of 17 years (exit rates are from Everingham and Rydell, Modeling the Demand for Cocaine, p. 
17). Preponderance of heavy use in current use is from Everingham and Rydell, pp. 14–17. Lifetime consumption ratio can 
be calculated from the ratio of heavy users’ annual consumption to that of light users, 8.25 (inverting the calculation in Ever-
ingham and Rydell, p. 17), and the user careers estimated above. Because heavy users are assumed to have a light-use career 
ﬁrst, heavy users consume at the light-use rate for 5.75 years and at 8.25 times the light-use rate for 17 years, so the lifetime 
ratio is then [5.75 + (8.25 x 17)]/5.75 = 25. Source of drug-related violence is from Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum 
Drug Sentences, pp. 68, 175–183.
12 Hser et al., “A 33-Year Follow-Up of Narcotics Addicts.”
13 More speciﬁcally, there is a much higher probability that a cigarette or alcohol user will become a marijuana user than that 
a nonuser of cigarettes or alcohol will, and analogously for marijuana use as a precursor to cocaine and other illicit-drug use. 
These relationships are from The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, Cigarettes, 
Alcohol, Marijuana, pp. 9–16. However, these probabilities have been falling among the post-1963 birth cohorts (Golub and 
Johnson, “Variation in Youthful Risks of Progression from Alcohol and Tobacco to Marijuana and to Hard Drugs Across 
Generations,” pp. 225–32). Forty-four percent of amphetamine (including methamphetamine) users reported as entering 
treatment in 2001 acknowledged using marijuana also, as did 31 percent of crack users (SAMHSA, Oﬃce of Applied Studies, 
Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS): 1992–2001,  Chapter 3, also at http://www.dasis.samhsa.gov/teds01/teds2k1chp3.htm; 
note “users” here are actually treatment episodes, that is, the same user may be counted twice or more).How Successful Has the War on Drugs Been?    11
two are attractive to use in combination. In fact, data on price and use suggest that marijuana, 
cocaine, and heroin are, if anything, complements, that is, an increase in the use of any of them 
(e.g., because of a decrease in price) is accompanied by an increase in use of the others.14
While there is no doubt that some users move from one drug to another, it is not clear that 
use of one drug “causes” or even encourages use of others. In particular, use of marijuana has been 
called a gateway to other drug use, the notion being that marijuana use increases the likelihood 
of using more dangerous drugs like cocaine or heroin. This notion is at least plausible: users’ ap-
petites for other drug experiences might be whetted by pleasurable use of marijuana. The gateway 
hypothesis also appears to draw support from the fact that marijuana users are many times more 
likely to become hard-drug users than are people who do not use marijuana. Furthermore, people 
who use marijuana and hard drugs at one point or another almost invariably use marijuana 
ﬁrst. However, such evidence is not by itself suﬃcient to support a causal relationship between 
marijuana and other drug use. It has been shown that the apparent elevation in risk of hard-drug 
use among marijuana users could also be explained by two factors in combination: diﬀerences 
in opportunities to use various drugs (marijuana is more readily available to young people than 
hard drugs) and the possibility that individuals diﬀer in their propensities to try any drugs. This 
alternative explanation has been partially undermined by further empirical work on twins show-
ing that in genetically identical or very similar individuals, marijuana use is indeed associated 
with a higher probability of other drug use. The question of marijuana’s gateway status has thus 
not been settled. It is noteworthy that marijuana’s inferred gateway eﬀect is a linchpin of the ar-
gument for diﬀerentiating marijuana control policy from alcohol control (although an argument 
can be made that alcohol might also be a gateway drug).15
Epidemics and Control Policy
Because drug use is spread mainly through social contacts and because most users sooner or 
later desist from use, patterns of drug use over time can have some of the characteristics of a 
contagious epidemic. Interest in cocaine, for example, was revitalized in the 1970s, spread 
rapidly through the mid-1980s, and then began subsiding. In cocaine’s case, enforcement may 
have played a role in the recession of the “epidemic,” but the epidemic pattern has held for dif-
ferent drugs in diverse countries with varying control policies in diﬀerent eras. It is evident that 
factors other than government policies are at work. The increases in drug use at the “outbreak” 
of an epidemic are also far faster than corresponding changes in underlying social variables 
(e.g., unemployment). The likely cause is that, while the epidemic is in outbreak mode, large 
numbers of new, light users are recruiting even larger numbers of light users. With the passage 
of time and the progression of more consumers to heavy use, adverse eﬀects become more 
noticeable and some of the sheen begins to wear oﬀ the drug. Light use, with its risk of addic-
tion and ill eﬀects, no longer seems so attractive, and that dilutes the recruiting power of light 
users. Furthermore, as social circles amenable to drug use become exhausted of nonusers, the 
14 Saﬀer and Chaloupka, “The Demand for Illicit Drugs.” 
15 Morral, McCaﬀrey, and Paddock, “Reassessing the Marijuana Gateway Eﬀect,” and Lynskey et al., “Escalation of Drug 
Use in Early-Onset Cannabis Users vs. Co-Twin Controls.” A conclusion diﬀering from that of Morral et al. is also drawn by 
Wagner and Anthony, “Into the World of Illegal Drug Use.” 12    How Goes the War on Drugs?
number of prospects left to recruit shrinks. Use of the drug begins to ebb, sometimes down to 
levels prior to the epidemic, sometimes stabilizing at endemic levels. This cycle can take a long 
time, as heavy-use careers can last many years. Hence, there remains a large number of people 
who continue to experience the problems of the aﬄiction, even while there are few new cases. 
The implication is that a small number of epidemic outbreak years could be responsible for a 
large portion of the drug problem later on.16
The use of certain drugs thus comes and, sometimes, goes, control policies notwithstand-
ing. This has important ramiﬁcations for interpreting the eﬀectiveness of those policies. If an 
epidemic is waning for the reasons mentioned above, decreases in use with the passage of time 
may have little to do with government policies intended to control it. If an epidemic is waxing, 
control policies may be more eﬀective than they seem if they keep use of the drug from grow-
ing faster than it would have without them.
The implication for policymakers framing national drug control goals is as follows: While 
speciﬁc use reduction targets represent laudable objectives, they may be very easy or very dif-
ﬁcult to achieve, depending on factors largely outside the government’s control. The admin-
istration may wind up taking too much credit if the target is met or (worse yet!) not enough, 
even though it is not met.
U.S. Drug Use Trends in Historical and Global Context
There is good reason for considering the long history of drug use in the United States—and in 
other countries: It aﬀords some perspective on current U.S. drug problems. If the United States 
is substantially better oﬀ than it has historically been or than other countries are now, perhaps 
Americans should not expect too much more from drug policy. If there have been times or are 
now similar societies where drug use is lower, that argues, at the least, for an investigation as to the 
reasons why.
Fairly good evidence on the history of U.S. drug use goes back as far as the mid-19th cen-
tury. Since then, use of diﬀerent drugs has varied considerably. Drug use in general, however, 
appears to have been quite low in the 1940s and 1950s. For example, in the national drug use 
surveys, hardly anyone born around 1930 reports having ever used marijuana. Such persons 
would have reached peak initiation ages during the 1940s and 1950s. For persons born after 
the early 1950s, and thus reaching drug-using ages in the late 1960s and 1970s, the lifetime 
prevalence rate is on the order of 50 percent.17
What was responsible for the increase in drug use between these generations? Some have 
placed the blame on cultural forces (or “moral forces”). Antiestablishment attitudes and activi-
ties were common among young adults, especially college students, who faced the prospect 
of being drafted to ﬁght an unpopular war. Drugs became part of the “counter culture” em-
16 On the commonality and rapidity of occurrence of epidemic phenomena, see Winkler, Caulkins, Behrens, and Tragler, 
“Estimating the Relative Eﬃciency of Various Forms of Prevention at Diﬀerent Stages of a Drug Epidemic.” David F. Musto 
advanced the application of the epidemic model to illicit drugs; see, for example, his discussion with respect to the U.S. 
experience of 1885 to the 1920s in “Lessons of the First Cocaine Epidemic,” The Wall Street Journal, June 11, 1986, p. 30. 
For combination of this model with the limiting eﬀects of a ﬁnite susceptible population, see, for example, Kleiman, Against 
Excess, pp. 43–44.
17 For 19th century opium consumption in the United States, see Musto, The American Disease, pp. 2–5. How Successful Has the War on Drugs Been?    13
bodying politically and sexually revolutionary perspectives. They were even seen as part of the 
pathway to a “higher consciousness.” While the speciﬁc causes and eﬀects can be debated, there 
was no speciﬁc change in government drug policy between the 1950s and 1960s that abetted 
the eﬄorescence of the drug culture.18
Some current drug problems are common across nations. For example, heroin use at U.S. 
levels has been found in a number of other wealthy nations (e.g., Australia, Switzerland). And, 
from 1992 to 1996, youth marijuana use increased in Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Some European rates for youth have been approach-
ing those experienced in the United States. These common trends are interesting, given diﬀer-
ences across those nations in strictures against marijuana use and their enforcement.19
Conversely, many developed countries have experienced smaller problems with some 
other illicit drugs than the United States has. Cocaine in particular has been consumed at lower 
rates in wealthy European nations, so the higher rates of amphetamine use in some countries 
still leave them with a total stimulant problem that is smaller than that in the United States.20
Such variations are tantalizing. Current U.S. drug policy varies to a modest extent across 
states, but these diﬀerences largely pertain to diﬀerences in severity of punishment rather than 
large-scale alternatives to enforcement. If there is anything to be learned from taking a very dif-
ferent approach, it can only be found elsewhere. Indeed, European experiments with more lax 
control regimes have been cited by both reformers and defenders of U.S. policy in support of 
their positions.21
The use of the same evidence to arrive at diﬀerent policy conclusions suggests the strength 
of prior beliefs and other cultural factors in drug policy formation. Certainly, cultural diﬀerences 
have importantly inﬂuenced diﬀerences among nations in drug control strategy. Spain, for exam-
ple, has a long anarchist tradition and a distaste for government control remaining from the years 
of repression under Franco, so it does not criminalize drug possession. Sweden mandates treat-
ment for drug abuse suspects, even if no arrest has been made, a practice that is consistent with 
a paternalistic attitude toward abuse of alcohol, a long-standing serious problem there. Sweden 
also rejects measures that might reduce drug harms but sustain or increase use. In that regard, it 
is similar to the United States, but the Swedish policy emanates more from a national passion for 
abstinence than from U.S.-style arguments that harm reduction “sends the wrong message.”22
18 The characterization of the drug culture in the 1960s is from Bennett, DeIulio, and Walters, Body Count: Moral Poverty … 
And How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs, p. 147, and Musto, The American Disease, pp. 247–248.
19 MacCoun and Reuter, Drug War Heresies, p. 124.
20 In 2002, the lifetime cocaine prevalence rate in the United States was 14.4 percent, and the rate for other stimulants was 
9.0 percent. In the part of Germany encompassed by the former Federal Republic, the analogous rates for cocaine and am-
phetamines were 2.3 percent and 2.3 percent; in France, 1.6 percent and 1.5 percent; in Sweden, 1.0 percent and 2.0 percent; 
in the United Kingdom, 5.6 percent and 12.3 percent (U.S. rates are from Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, Oﬃce of Applied Studies, “2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables,” Table 1.1B, 
http://oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k2nsduh/Sect1peTabs1to18.pdf. European rates are from the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Abuse, Annual Report 2003: The State of the Drugs Problem in the European Union and Norway, Statistical 
Table 1, http://www.emcdda.eu.int/pdfs/stattab01-en/pdf.
21 On drug policy variation within the United States, see ImpacTeen Illicit Drug Team, Illicit Drug Policies. The use of Euro-
pean policies in the U.S. debate is discussed by MacCoun and Reuter, Drug War Heresies, pp. 205–206.
22 MacCoun and Reuter, Drug War Heresies, pp. 297–298, 388.14    How Goes the War on Drugs?
Clearly, drug problems and drug policy vary considerably from one nation to another. If 
any general global trend can be discerned, it is toward greater availability of drugs. Growing 
chemical expertise, even in developing countries remote from major markets, and “learning 
by doing” on the part of producers have multiplied the varieties of drug oﬀered at prices that 
might attract new consumers or keep old ones interested. At the same time, globalization 
has aﬀected the illegal drug industry just as it has others. Advances in communication and 
transportation and the lowering of trade barriers have made it more diﬃcult for national gov-
ernments to control what passes through their borders, and the growing integration of the 
global ﬁnancial system has facilitated money laundering. Producers have shown ﬂexibility in 
diversifying the drug crops they grow, and reﬁners in switching their sources between coun-
tries, which has made it harder for the United States to isolate its domestic drug market from 
internationally prevailing lower prices.23
23 On increasing availability and globalization, see Stares, Global Habit, pp. 1–9.How Successful Has the War on Drugs 
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CHAPTER THREE
Why Hasn’t the Drug War Been a Greater Success?
To summarize the discussion so far, some simple measures show the war on drugs might be 
considered successful; others show it generally as a failure. However, such measures do not fully 
capture all the forces at work and are thus not reliable indicators of success or failure.
Granted the diﬃculties in arriving at an indisputable assessment, few people seem very 
satisﬁed with the accomplishments of U.S. drug policy to date. There appears to be a sense that 
the United States has spent too many billions of dollars over too many years to have just gone 
through a decade in which youth drug initiation actually increased and heroin and cocaine 
dependence declined only modestly. We have shown how the prevailing policy’s eﬀectiveness 
may have been compromised by the dynamics of drug use initiation, intensity, and endurance 
as they play out over the entire population of drug users and over all drugs. What else may 
have gone wrong?
Could the Balance among Enforcement, Treatment, and Prevention Have 
Been Improved?
The war on drugs has been fought through a mix of strategies, notably:
  •  enforcement, against producers (including those overseas), smugglers, dealers at various 
levels in U.S. drug markets, and users.
  •  treatment of heavy users, typically through programs involving many months of counseling
  •  educational campaigns against drug use, often embodied either in school curricula or in 
media advertising.
To date, the federal antidrug budget has been tilted toward enforcement. In ﬁscal year 
2003, for example, 53 percent of the president’s requested drug control budget was for enforce-16    How Goes the War on Drugs?
ment, 29 percent for treatment, and 18 percent for prevention. The emphasis on enforcement 
is often pointed out by critics of prevailing spending priorities. However, that allocation in 
itself does not imply that enforcement is being overfunded relative to the other approaches. If 
enforcement were able to produce greater progress toward drug policy goals per dollar spent 
on it, that might justify the emphasis (although there are considerations other than eﬃciency). 
The best available evidence suggests, however, that that is not the case.1
In 1997, for example, it was estimated that an additional million dollars spent on federal 
enforcement activities within U.S. borders ﬁve years earlier would have reduced total cocaine 
consumption by 53 to 98 kilograms (or between 150 and 280 average “careers” of cocaine use). 
The parallel estimate for treatment of heavy users was 97 to 119 kilograms (between 280 and 
340 careers). A case could thus be made that, if the goal has been to reduce drug consumption, 
at least as much progress toward that goal could have been made within the same total budget 
by shifting some money from enforcement to treatment. Furthermore, treatment attacks de-
mand directly, whereas enforcement does so by raising prices (insofar as it targets suppliers and 
not users). Thus, while treatment unambiguously reduces the dollar value of the black market, 
enforcement may or may not. Whether it does depends on whether the increased prices are 
more than oﬀset by decreased consumption; the consensus of estimates to date is that they are 
just oﬀset. Treatment’s eﬀects on black market revenue are therefore likely to be greater than 
enforcement’s, so treatment’s eﬀects on drug-related crime are also likely to be greater. Such 
logic does not, however, support the wholesale replacement of enforcement by treatment. The 
estimates on which the logic is based are valid only at funding levels not far removed from 
current ones. The eﬀectiveness of treatment may depend on having a big enough enforcement 
“stick” available as a deterrent. That is, if there were no reason to fear arrest after relapse into 
usage, fewer treatment participants might make the eﬀort to stay clean.2
It should not be very surprising that an enforcement-heavy strategy would have only 
limited success against the established drug markets now prevailing in the United States. Drug 
markets are fractionated and local in nature. Drug supply chains are networks, not rigid hierar-
chies. There is no national organization whose local operations can be crippled through arrests 
made at the top. Also, arrested sellers are easily replaced.3
1 Budget breakdown is calculated from The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, 2003, p. 5. An example of a critique 
of the emphasis on enforcement is that by Drug Policy Alliance, “Outgoing Drug Czar Issues Report Claiming ‘Substan-
tial Progress’; Critics Say Drug War Has Failed, New Standards Are Needed,” http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/pressroom/ 
pressrelease/pr_january04_01xczar.cfm, quoting Ethan Nadelmann, Lindesmith Center–Drug Policy Foundation.
2 Cost-eﬀectiveness data are from Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences, p. 143. The range limits given are 
the 25th and 75th percentiles of a Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis; that is, when input parameters were varied randomly, 
the cost-eﬀectiveness result fell within the range cited 50 percent of the time. The ranges give the impression that treatment’s 
cost-eﬀectiveness might be close to enforcement’s, but the probability of that occurring is less than might be expected. That 
is because if a parameter variation resulted in cost-eﬀectiveness values near the low end of treatment’s range, it also tended 
to result in values in the lower half of enforcement’s range. Careers reduced are based on 0.35 kg consumed in the average 
career, as reported in Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug Prevention, p. 21. Treatment’s greater eﬀect on drug market revenue 
and crime is from Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences, p. 68, and the limitation to marginal changes is from 
the same source, p. 79.
3 On market fractionation and distribution networks, see Jonathan P. Caulkins, “Modeling the Domestic Distribution Net-
work for Illicit Drugs.” On seller replacement, see Kleiman, “The Problem of Replacement and the Logic of Drug Law En-
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It might seem odd that treatment could be at least as cost-eﬀective as enforcement at 
reducing drug sales, when enforcement actually removes drugs and dealers from the street, 
whereas many treated users go back to using again. Treatment might indeed be less cost- 
eﬀective if the objective is to get users to quit altogether. But what if the goal is to reduce the 
quantity of drugs consumed? In that case, just as much is achieved by cutting the use of all in-
dividuals by 10 percent as by getting one in ten to quit and leaving the other nine as they were. 
Fractional individual use reductions can be achieved if the user simply stays clean during treat-
ment, and there is a potential bonus—the treatment client who actually quits permanently. 
(A study that strongly supports the cost-eﬀectiveness of treatment assumed that, on any given 
attempt, only 13 percent of those treated quit heavy use, with two-thirds of that 13 percent 
vulnerable to relapse.)4
Treatment is also much cheaper than enforcement in that it costs much less to run a heavy 
user through treatment than it does to incarcerate a seller (or the user). In addition, since most 
heavy users consume multiple drugs, driving demand down for one drug by increasing treat-
ment may reduce demand for other drugs as well.5
While putting more emphasis on treatment, and perhaps prevention as well, might have 
led to more success in reducing drug consumption, these alternative approaches can, at best, 
reduce America’s drug problems slowly. They both proceed by small degrees. Treatment suc-
ceeds in terms of small percentages of permanent desistance and of small lifetime use reduc-
tions by those who do not quit. Likewise, school-based prevention succeeds in terms of small 
decrements in drug use by program participants (and their social networks) versus nonpartici-
pants. It has been estimated that, based on data from several programs, prevention cuts the av-
erage program participant’s lifetime marijuana consumption by only 1.7 percent. Prevention’s 
modest success should not be surprising: there is only so much that a program that is often 
only 30 hours long can do to reverse the eﬀects of thousands of hours of less salutary exposure 
to television, peers, and so forth. However, prevention is so inexpensive that it is cost-eﬀective 
and worth pursuing even though its eﬀects are modest.6
Both treatment and prevention are also slow to take cumulative eﬀect. Treating a heavy 
user can bring a stream of beneﬁts lasting many years, but only about one-sixth of those ben-
eﬁts accrue within the year of treatment. The program cost, however, accrues entirely within 
the ﬁrst year, so, at the aggregate level, treatment looks less cost-eﬀective than longer sentences 
4 It is easy to ﬁnd much higher average success rates, for example, 20 percent to 69 percent for cocaine use. However, these 
and most other treatment success data are from large, uncontrolled, observational studies instead of controlled experiments. We 
thus think it prudent to use the results based on the conservative 13 percent ﬁgure, from Rydell and Everingham, Control-
ling Cocaine, pp. 19, 24. The 20 to 69 percent is from Duhamel, “Drug Use Outcomes in Four Substance Abuse Treatment 
Studies.”
5 The costs of treatment and enforcement are from Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences, p. 136.
6 By virtue of lower consumption during treatment alone, a single course of treatment would be expected to cut a heavy user’s 
lifetime cocaine consumption by a quarter of a year’s consumption. As noted above, lifetime consumption by a heavy user 
is almost 18 years at the heavy-use rate. The quarter-year savings is from Rydell and Everingham, Controlling Cocaine, p. 24. 
Prevention’s eﬀect on lifetime marijuana consumption is from Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug Prevention, p. 158 (conser-
vative delay scenario, medium end-of-program eﬀectiveness, linear decay). The 30-hour program length is for the Life Skills 
Training Program, as reported by Caulkins et al., An Ounce of Prevention, a Pound of Uncertainty, p. 49. Beneﬁts and costs of 
prevention are compared in Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug Prevention, p. 32.18    How Goes the War on Drugs?
to people with very short time horizons. Colloquially, treatment is like an investment, arrest-
ing and incarcerating sellers for a year or two is like paying as you go, and extending sentences 
from 1–2 years to 5–10 years is like buying with a credit card. (See Figure 3.1, in which the 
cost-eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent control strategies are compared across horizons of 1 to 15 years, 
that is, no beneﬁts or costs beyond the horizon are counted.) Likewise, prevention can do 
nothing about the large number of adults who have been using for a long time; it can only re-
duce the rate of recruitment into the pool of users. When it comes to immediacy and certainty 
of eﬀect, enforcement thus has the advantage. If a drug dealer sets up business across the street, 
bringing enforcement to bear will get the problem addressed. Increasing the number of treat-
ment slots will not.7
It is important to pay attention to the dates for which cost-eﬀectiveness estimates apply 
because, as we have discussed, drug use is not static. Rates of initiation and heavy use change 
over the course of epidemics such as that for cocaine. Treatment of heavy users could not much 
aﬀect total consumption early in an epidemic, before there are many heavy users. Neither 
can much be expected of prevention programs run late in an epidemic, when initiation has 
dropped oﬀ. (Such programs may help prevent the next epidemic, however.) Like prevention, 
enforcement may be most cost-eﬀective at reducing drug use if employed early. Later, when the 
market has matured and supplies and dealers are plentiful, it is more diﬃcult for enforcement 
to limit production and distribution than it is to do so earlier, when the targets are fewer. On 
Figure 3.1
Longer Sentences Look Better When the Evaluation Horizon Is Very Short
SOURCE: From Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences, p. 36.
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7 Distribution of costs and beneﬁts of treatment over time is from Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences, pp. 
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the other hand, enforcement actions can be relevant and valuable throughout an epidemic if 
their purpose is not simply to reduce use but also the harmful consequences of drug use. For 
example, one would always like to see some level of enforcement directed to reducing the in-
volvement of juveniles in the drug trade, by targeting dealers who employ them.8
Although the eﬀectiveness of drug policies varies over the course of an epidemic, they 
are largely crafted and implemented as if drug use were indeed static. Treatment’s share of the 
annual federal antidrug budget, for example, stayed between 17 and 20 percent from 1987 
to 1995, as the nature of the drug problem changed considerably. There is little evidence to 
suggest that the mix of drug control strategies varies substantially in response to the evolving 
threat—or to suggest that the value of that kind of responsiveness is even recognized.9
Could the Balance among Enforcement Strategies Have Been Improved?
Enforcement is itself a varied collection of activities, and it is directed at diﬀerent stages in the 
drug production “pipeline”:10
  •  Source country control: ﬁnancial, technical, intelligence, and equipment aid to source 
countries attempting to eradicate drug crops, shut down processing facilities, reduce ex-
ports, and bring to justice those involved in the drug trade.
  •  Interdiction en route to the United States: actions by the Coast Guard and by agents of 
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to interrupt the movement of 
drugs between the source country and U.S. borders.
  •  Domestic enforcement: seizure of drugs and other assets within U.S. borders and the ar-
rest, prosecution, and punishment of drug dealers and users.
At each stage it is important to distinguish three types of eﬀects. First, enforcement can 
create temporary disruption by “surprising” the supply network with unexpected new tactics 
or intensities of eﬀort. That creates shortages and price spikes. As already suggested, surprise 
disruption is very hard to achieve within the United States for a mature, mass-market drug. 
Successes include, in the early 1970s, the disruption of the “French connection” for heroin 
through arrests, Turkey’s ban on poppy growing, and the spraying of the Mexican marijuana 
crop, and, in 1989, Colombia’s attack on the Medellin cocaine cartel. Such successes have 
predominantly been in the source zone or sometimes in transit, where a smaller number of 
8 The discussion of policies responsive to epidemic stages is based on Behrens et al., “Optimal Control of Drug Epidemics,”   
and Tragler, Caulkins, and Feichtinger, “Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Treatment and Enforcement in Illicit Drug Control.”   
On focused law enforcement, see Caulkins, “Law Enforcement’s Role in a Harm Reduction Regime.”
9 Treatment’s share is from The White House, The National Drug Control Strategy, 1996, pp. 318–319. ONDCP’s estimates 
of treatment’s share are probably liberal. (See Murphy et al., Improving Anti-Drug Budgeting, pp. 104–107.) However, there is 
no reason to believe that the consistency from year to year is an artifact.
10 We here follow the paradigm used in Rydell and Everingham, Controlling Cocaine, p. xii.20    How Goes the War on Drugs?
organizations is responsible for a larger share of the market. Unfortunately, even at those pro-
duction stages, notable successes are infrequent.11
Second, enforcement can aﬀect the severity of drug-related consequences for each ki-
logram consumed, even if it does not aﬀect the quantity consumed. Selective enforcement 
against dealers who are particularly violent, corrupting, or otherwise noxious might reduce 
drug-related consequences if any replacement of those dealers is with less noxious ones. Un-
fortunately, there is, as of yet, little to no quantitative evidence concerning this second class of 
eﬀects at any of the three major production pipeline stages.
Third, enforcement can “tax” the supply chain by imposing costs and complications 
that—at the aggregate level—are anticipated and adjusted for. That is not to say that any indi-
vidual anticipates arrest or any organization expects elimination. However, if, as has been the 
case for some years, the United States annually seizes 100 metric tons of cocaine and consumes 
300 metric tons, the supply chain will plan to ship about 400 tons next year. Such market 
responsiveness does not mean that anticipated seizures are ineﬀective. The 300 tons still has to 
be sold at higher prices to compensate for the 100 tons that are seized.12
This type of eﬀect has been well studied in the case of cocaine in the early 1990s. Analyses 
suggest that domestic enforcement was one-third again as cost-eﬀective as interdiction and 
three times as cost-eﬀective as source country control at reducing cocaine consumption (see 
Figure 3.2). That is, assume that an extra million dollars were spent arresting, prosecuting, and 
incarcerating typical dealers under the sentencing regimen prevailing before the introduction 
of mandatory minimums. Cocaine consumption would then decrease by an amount three 
times what it would if the extra million dollars were spent on source country control. The rea-
sons are not diﬃcult to understand. Production costs in the Andean countries are small, and 
the amounts of product required are not large by agricultural standards. There is plenty of land 
available to grow the coca needed to produce the 400 tons of cocaine shipped each year to the 
United States. Even if local production costs were to go up substantially, the rise might still be 
small compared to the huge mark-up between the source country and the street, so the price 
users pay might not be much aﬀected.13 
Interdiction is not much less problematic in this regard than source country control. Four 
hundred tons may sound like a lot, but it is a negligible fraction of the legitimate commerce 
11 On enforcement surprises and their eﬀects, see Caulkins, “Measurement and Analysis of Drug Problems and Drug Control 
Eﬀorts.” On successes (and qualiﬁcations thereto), see Kleiman, Against Excess, pp. 132–133. On the limits to enforcement 
more generally, see Reuter, “The Limits of Supply-Side Drug Control.” 
12 From 1992 through 2000, federal cocaine seizures ranged from 101 to 132 metric tons, according to The White House, 
National Drug Control Strategy, 2003, “Data Supplement,” p. 55. For the same period, U.S. cocaine consumption ranged from 
259 to 346 metric tons, according to Abt Associates, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, p. 19.
13 On the investment required to grow coca: In 1990, it cost $700 per hectare (2.47 acres) to grow coca in the Upper Huallaga 
Valley of Peru, an amount that would generate $1,680 in proﬁt to the farmer. It has been estimated that coca is grown on less 
than 1 percent of the land on which it could be cultivated in Bolivia and Peru alone. It takes $700 worth of coca leaf to pro-
duce cocaine valued at $150,000 on the street (Riley, Snow Job? pp. 126, 142, 83). Thus, doubling the price of the leaf would 
add only $700 or about 0.5 percent to the street price. Indeed, sharp ﬂuctuations in coca leaf prices over the last decade have 
not been reﬂected in retail cocaine prices in the United States. (See Reuter, “The Limits of Supply-Side Drug Control.”) It has, 
however, been argued that the pricing structure of the cocaine market is multiplicative, that is, that an x percent increase in 
costs at the source results in an x percent increase in costs on the street. In that case, source country control (and interdiction) 
could yield appreciable street price increases. See Crane, Rivolo, and Comfort, An Experimental Examination of Counterdrug 
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across U.S. borders every year. Colombia, for example, ships an average of 170,000 tons of cof-
fee to the United States each year. Because the drugs are worth many times their weight in gold, 
the ﬁnancial rewards justify using quite sophisticated means of camouﬂaging the contraband. 
Attempts to shut down prevailing supply routes and means can be circumvented at modest 
cost by use of alternate routes and means.14
Domestic enforcement collectively may look good by comparison, but not all elements 
of domestic enforcement are equally cost-eﬀective. Figure 3.2 shows the cost-eﬀectiveness of a 
fourth alternative: using the extra million dollars to extend to mandatory-minimum lengths the 
sentences of typical arrested dealers. This incarceration-only alternative would be less than half as 
cost-eﬀective as expanding the full suite of conventional enforcement measures under a regime 
of shorter sentences. Incarceration is problematic because, while it does place high costs on drug 
dealers, it is also costly to the public. Furthermore, which drug dealers incur incarceration risk? 
With mandatory minimum sentences, it is often those physically in possession of a given quan-
tity of drugs, and those are rarely the dealers near the head of the supply chain. In contrast, not 
only do drugs and other property seized at the time of arrest represent a signiﬁcant cost to dealers, 
but accomplishing those seizures has a lower public cost than incarceration.15
Figure 3.2
Cost-Effectiveness Comparison of Enforcement Strategies
SOURCE: Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences, pp. 45, 143.
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14 The coﬀee import number is the average over 1997–2001 data from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Commodity and 
Marketing Programs, “U.S. General Imports of Agricultural, Fish, and Forestry Products from Colombia.”
15 In 1992, Kleiman, Against Excess, p. 140, estimated that a year in prison costs a cocaine dealer $25,000 to $50,000. The 
taxpayer cost of a year in prison at that time was approximately $25,000, according to Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum 
Drug Sentences, p. 86. The type of drug dealers incurring incarceration risk is from Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug 
Sentences, pp. 15–16, 18. It costs about $22,000 to arrest and adjudicate a cocaine suspect, while in federal cases assets forfeited 
amount on average to perhaps $64,000, of which $15,000 are nondrug assets that can oﬀset the arrest costs (averages account 
for zeroes in the case of not-guilty dispositions; from Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences, pp. 121, 123).22    How Goes the War on Drugs?
In sum, then, the drug war might have achieved more if 
  •  policy had been more sensitive to the particular strengths and weaknesses of enforcement, 
treatment, and prevention and had been more responsive to the changing nature of drug 
use
  •  more of the funding expansion since the late 1980s had been allocated to treatment rather 
than enforcement
  •  less emphasis had been placed on giving very long sentences, particularly when those 
sentences were mostly triggered by the quantity possessed at the time of arrest.
Thus, if the goal had been to reduce total consumption by some amount, that could 
have been done more cheaply by treating heavy users than by incarcerating dealers for lon-
ger periods. From that perspective, choosing the incarceration option has thus wasted money 
that could have been spent on other aspects of enforcement (e.g., against other crimes) or on 
achieving other social purposes. The oﬃcial national goal, however, has been decreasing the 
fraction of the population that uses, and, as suggested above, treatment’s cost-eﬀectiveness at 
achieving that goal may be lower.
More generally, we should emphasize here that we are not attempting to assign blame. In-
formation on costs and eﬀectiveness of the various strategies was unavailable as federal spend-
ing on drug control was rising rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is unfortunate, 
however, that little was invested in eﬀorts to evaluate the strategies on which large amounts 
were being expended. That was particularly true of the various enforcement approaches; much 
more has been invested in evaluating prevention and treatment, on which less is spent.16
16 For data on the rise in the federal drug control budget (which quadrupled between 1986 and 1992), see The White House, 
The National Drug Control Strategy, 1996: Program, Resources, and Evaluation.  On the lack of research on enforcement rela-
tive to the money spent on it, see Reuter, “Why Can’t We Make Prohibition Work Better?” Why Hasn’t the Drug War Been 
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CHAPTER FOUR
What About Bonuses and Collateral Damage?
To this point, we have been discussing whether the drug war has been successful and how it 
might have been more so in terms of its central goals of reducing drug use and use-related 
harms. Drug control policy cannot, however, be evaluated solely on the basis of whether it has 
achieved its stated aims. It has had side eﬀects, both good and bad.
Though it has not always been a formally stated aim, reduction of the crime associated with 
drug use and sales would be regarded by many people as an important (and expected) “bonus.” 
Drug control may indeed have been partly responsible for the decline in crime rates in general 
that the nation experienced during the 1990s. If the additional resources devoted to enforcement 
have decreased consumption, as the cost-eﬀectiveness studies suggest, then crime by persons un-
der the inﬂuence should have gone down. Moreover, greater emphasis on incarceration may have 
kept persons oﬀ the street who may otherwise have committed crimes other than drug oﬀenses, 
either because of their expensive drug habits or because of their other characteristics.1
On the negative side, it has been argued that the drug war has imposed “collateral dam-
age” in several realms, for example,2
  •  erosion of civil liberties
  •  erosion of police integrity
  •  exacerbation of drug-related harms such as the spread of HIV infection
  •  generation of consequences beyond the criminal justice system; such sanctions have nega-
tive eﬀects on families and communities.
1 The violent crime rate has fallen from 758 per 100,000 persons in 1991 to 504 in 2001 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Crime in the United States, 2001, p. 64).
2 For erosion of civil liberties and police integrity, see Bertram et al., Drug War Politics, pp. 46–50. Sources for the other two 
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The ﬁrst of these is an important matter of justice and values but is not one to whose assess-
ment we can contribute analytically. The second has not been measured in any systematic way. 
We oﬀer some brief observations on the other two, both of which have implications for the 
equity of the distribution of drug control costs across racial, ethnic, and economic groups.
Endemic use of heroin and other injection drugs has promoted infection with HIV, hepa-
titis C virus (HCV), and other infectious diseases. The root cause of this infection is thus not 
federal drug policy, but that policy has exacerbated the problem by seeking primarily to reduce 
use instead of use-related harm. For example, needle exchanges might reduce HIV and HCV 
infection. However, funding of such programs is explicitly banned at the federal level on the 
theory that they promote drug abuse (a theory unsupported by research). The current rate at 
which HIV and HCV are spreading may thus be viewed as a side eﬀect of the campaign against 
drugs, to the extent that it is higher than it would have been otherwise.3
By the drug war’s “consequences beyond the criminal justice system,” we mean its eﬀects on 
families and communities and eﬀects on the oﬀender beyond ﬁnes, forfeitures, and incarceration. 
These eﬀects have been concentrated in racial and ethnic minority communities, because most 
of them are triggered by conviction of a drug oﬀense, and drug oﬀenders are disproportionately 
minority. (In 1996, blacks alone constituted 53 percent of drug convicts at the state level, where 
the great majority of drug cases are prosecuted.) Among the consequences are the following:4
  •  Family disruption. Black children are nine times more likely to have a parent in prison 
than are white children.5
  •  Limitations in access to family support payments. Conviction of any drug oﬀense per-
manently bars the individual from receiving food stamps or Temporary Aid for Needy 
Families. (However, the weak available evidence suggests that there is little enforcement 
of this by state welfare agencies; they tend not to keep track of criminal histories.)
  •  Eviction from public housing. Drug abuse and convictions are used by public housing 
authorities to deny access and to evict tenants, including the families of oﬀenders, not just 
the oﬀenders themselves.
  •  Limitations in access to student aid. Those convicted of drug possession are ineligible for 
federal student aid for at least a year.
  •  Deportation of immigrants. Drug felonies are responsible for 41 percent of deportations 
executed on the basis of criminal convictions. Such deportations disproportionately aﬀect 
minority communities; the signiﬁcance of this eﬀect is uncertain.
3 Predominance of injection drug use in the spread of HIV and HCV infection is from the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, “NIDA InfoFacts: Drug Abuse and AIDS,” http://www.nida.nih.gov/Infofax/DrugAbuse.html, and “NIDA Com-
munity Drug Alert Bulletin—Hepatitis,” May 2000, http://www.drugabuse.gov/HepatitisAlert/HepatitisAlert.html, both as 
posted June 11, 2003. On the evolution of needle exchange funding policy and the relations among needle exchange, HIV 
propagation, and drug abuse, see Vlahov et al., “Needle Exchange Programs for the Prevention of Human Immunodeﬁciency 
Virus Infection.” 
4 Percentage of black convicts and predominance of state-level prosecutions are from Maguire and Pastore, Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics 2000. Sanctions are from Iguchi et al., “Elements of Well-Being Aﬀected by Criminalizing the Drug 
User.” 
5 Mumola, Incarcerated Parents and Their Children, p. 2.What About Bonuses and Collateral Damage?    25
  •  Employment restrictions. Felony convicts are disqualiﬁed from serving in the military or 
holding a government job.
  •  Reduction in political power. In most states, paroled felons cannot vote. In 1998, it was 
estimated that 13 percent of all black men had been temporarily or permanently disen-
franchised and that that ﬁgure would continue to grow if prevailing enforcement levels 
were maintained.6
Most of these eﬀects arise from extending sanctions to other domains of public life once 
the criminal justice system sanctions have lapsed. Because they remove social supports from 
reentering convicts, they may increase recidivism. They do, however, have the beneﬁt of keep-
ing the protected institutions free of those who have abused the public trust and who may be 
more likely than the average person to use drugs in the future. They also may add to the eﬀect 
of criminal sanctions in deterring those who would use drugs, and they add to the atmosphere 
of public disapprobation of drug use that may have some more general deterrent eﬀect.
Enforcement strategy has other implications for equity. For various reasons, the war on 
drugs appears to be fought mainly in minority communities. Minorities, for example, are 
much more likely to be imprisoned for violating drug laws than are whites. Criticisms that 
U.S. drug policy reﬂects prevailing racial and class privileges have been well aired elsewhere. It 
can be argued, however, that enforcement is appropriately focused on sellers, who locate dis-
proportionately in minority communities. Whether enforcement is the right strategy to direct 
toward users is controversial, but if so, it is relevant that frequent cocaine use is much more 
common in urban poverty areas, which tend also to be minority communities, than elsewhere. 
While exposure to the high costs of conviction and associated sanctions is principally borne by 
poorer, minority communities, the relatively modest household costs of funding the campaign 
against drugs are borne mainly by households with income above the median.7
Such racial disparities feed racial tensions. Minorities see that most drug convicts are 
black or brown and feel they are being unfairly targeted. White suburbanites may see the same 
disparity as evidence that drug epidemics emanate from inner-city neighborhoods to engulf 
innocent suburban schoolchildren. While racial dissension has not yet become the central issue 
in the debate over drug policy, it complicates the search for a solution: Inner-city communities 
are often skeptical about enforcement, while suburban communities may feel that at root, it’s 
not their problem.8
6 Fellner, Mauer, and Hirschﬁeld, “Losing the Vote: the Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States,” 
Chapters III (Table 2) and IV.
7 In 2001, 58 percent of prisoners in state prison on drug charges were black (calculated from prisoner counts in Harrison and 
Beck, Prisoners in 2001, p. 13). On the racial proﬁle of the drug war, see Bertram et al., Drug War Politics, pp. 36–45. On the 
concentration of drug sales in minority communities, see Kleiman, Against Excess, pp. 111–112, and Tonry, Malign Neglect. 
Frequency of cocaine use in poverty areas is from Brownsberger, “Prevalence of Frequent Cocaine Use in Urban Poverty Areas.”   
Individual income tax receipts account for about half of all federal revenue, and in 2000, 96 percent of all individual income 
tax receipts were from the top half of the income distribution (Internal Revenue Service, “Tax Stats at a Glance,” http://www.
irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=102886,00.html, as posted June 17, 2003, and Hoﬀman, Who Pays the Federal Individual Income 
Tax? p. 1).
8 On minority and white views regarding the drug war and the drug problem, see Bertram et al., Drug War Politics, pp. 42–45, 
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CHAPTER FIVE
Why No Course Corrections?
According to the evidence we have reviewed here, the war on drugs has not well met its own 
objectives and may have had some important negative side eﬀects. The perceptions of the gen-
eral public have not been more favorable over the years. In 1995, 72 percent of adults declared 
that the war on drugs had had no eﬀect on drug use in their community. In 1999, 72 percent 
of registered voters had the (mistaken) impression that drug use had increased (41 percent 
said “greatly”) over the previous ten years. And half of those asked agreed with the statement, 
“We are unable to win the war on drugs regardless of what the President and Congress do.” 
Similarly, in March 2001, 74 percent of adult Americans thought the United States was losing 
the drug war.1
Yet U.S. policymakers, with at least the tacit support of their skeptical electorate, have 
retained the long-standing enforcement-oriented policy. Why has the same strategy been pur-
sued despite widespread perceptions that it has not succeeded? Why haven’t promising alterna-
tive strategies, even within the broad parameters of prohibition, been tried?
Various reasons have been advanced: that enforcement proponents have narrowed the 
debate, partly by ignoring or maligning critics; that dissenting politicians cannot win by being 
less tough on drugs than their opponents; that drug use is seen as a moral failing deserving of 
punishment, not a health problem deserving of treatment. Voters and politicians may perceive 
that incarceration has more reliably predictable eﬀects than prevention or treatment. They may 
not be interested in individual use reductions and other half-measures; they may want to see 
their children free of addiction risk and addicts cured by treatment. It’s natural to want to place 
1 Percentage of adults declaring that the war on drugs had had no eﬀect is from the LexisNexis Web site, Roper Center at 
the University of Connecticut, “Public Opinion Online,” citing U.S. News and World Report, May 1993, citing Texas A&M 
Public Policy Institute, Crime in America, July 1995; 1999 data are from the LexisNexis Web site, Roper Center, “Public Opin-
ion Online,” citing Family Research Council, “Annual Survey on Drug Policy,” 1999; both as posted April 19, 2002; 2001 
response is from Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Interdiction and Incarceration Are Still Top Remedies,” 
March 21, 2001, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=16.28    How Goes the War on Drugs?
the blame on someone else, so interdiction and source country control are popular measures 
because they assign responsibility for the drug problem to foreigners and also are relatively in-
expensive. As we have pointed out, few voters feel drug policy’s negative consequences in their 
communities. State legislators may ﬁnd it easier, less of an immediate burden on the budget, 
and more sympathetic with public outrage to lengthen sentences than to empower more nu-
anced adjudication eﬀorts or augment treatment funding.2
This last approach may seem to contradict what we said earlier: incarceration is expensive, 
not cheap. However, states generally do not require that sentencing enhancements be accom-
panied by funding actions. Prisons are already constructed and staﬀed, so ﬁlling them up looks 
cost-free. Thus, there is no speciﬁc tax consequence to oﬀset the political value of lengthening 
sentences. Furthermore, a county’s district attorney deciding to more zealously pursue incar-
ceration can take free advantage of the state-provided prison resource. Eventually, however, the 
bill comes due, and some states have begun to take a harder look at their sentencing policies; 
the federal government, however, is still pushing for the longest prison terms possible.3
We also must concede that it is easier to criticize than to propose sound alternatives, 
that the evidence in favor of alternative approaches, while suggestive, is not strong enough to 
persuade skeptics. And some argue in favor of the opposite proposition, that the current ap-
proach is successful, or rather, that more of the same could be even more successful. However, 
as pointed out above, evidence for or against the eﬀectiveness of speciﬁc enforcement strategies 
is scarce. This reﬂects a tradition of scanty reliance on research and analysis within the criminal 
justice system as a whole.4
Finally, below the President, there is no one person responsible for U.S. drug policy. The 
drug “czar” is not a czar. He has no direct authority over the drug programs in federal agen-
cies other than his own, and the latter accounts for only a small fraction of the drug control 
budget. He has no authority whatsoever over drug control at state and local levels. Drug policy 
formation is fragmented across many agencies at all levels of government. Broad, crosscutting, 
nationwide shifts in policy could thus be diﬃcult to eﬀect. The impetus must emanate from 
legislative bodies, and, as we have noted, elected oﬃcials are not often interested in promoting 
a more nuanced drug policy.5
There are thus many possible reasons for drug policy inertia. Whatever the real reasons 
might be, they must be acknowledged and addressed as part of any strategy to move U.S. drug 
policy in more productive directions.
2 Reuter, “Why Does Research Have So Little Impact on American Drug Policy?”, and Bertram et al., Drug War Politics,   
p. 151.
3 On prison space as an apparently free common resource, see Benson and Rasmussen, “The Context of Drug Policy.” On 
reservations at the state level but not the federal, see Sullivan, “Missouri Sentencing Changes Stem Need for Prison Growth,”   
and Zielbauer, “Rethinking the Key Thrown Away.”
4 On the need for more enforcement, see Bennett, DeIulio, and Walters, Body Count, pp. 187–190, where, of ﬁve “priorities 
for eﬀective action,” four are enforcement-related. On the dearth of evidence for its eﬀectiveness, see Reuter, “Why Does Re-
search Have So Little Impact on American Drug Policy?” Regarding the lack of research on the criminal justice system more 
generally, see Blumstein and Petersilia, “Investing in Criminal Justice Research,” and Wilson, “What, if Anything, Can the 
Federal Government Do to Reduce Crime?” 
5 On the limited power of the ONDCP, see Musto, The American Disease, pp. 280–281, and Bertram et al., Drug War Politics, 
p. 132. On policy fragmentation, see Haaga and Reuter, “The Limits of the Czar’s Ukase.” 29
CHAPTER SIX
How Might U.S. Drug Problems and Policies Evolve?
Another prerequisite to any vision of future drug policy is an understanding of the future evo-
lution of drug use and other drug-related problems. It would also help to consider how drug 
policy might evolve in response to such trends, and thus whether reforms, if they are advisable, 
might be either easier or more diﬃcult to accomplish in the future.
Of course, there might be less need to think about the future if the past suggested little 
likelihood of change. And so it has been with the recent past. America’s drug problem, at least 
as far as the big three (cocaine, heroin, and marijuana) are concerned, has settled, superﬁcially 
at least, into a time of stability or, at most, predictable change: Overall usage has been steady 
or down some, and while initiation has rebounded, there has been nothing as dramatic as the 
propagation of the crack epidemic in the 1980s. As discussed above, this stability in drug prob-
lems is mirrored by an even longer-standing stability in drug policy, centered on enforcement 
and punishment.1
The inertia of the past decade or more is an exception, however. The 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s were periods of dramatic change in drug use: the spread of marijuana, the heroin epi-
demic, the explosion in cocaine initiation, and the spread of crack and street markets. And in 
thinking about the future, we should not limit ourselves to the recent history of the United 
States. Policy was quite diﬀerent a century ago in America, and in recent years it has changed 
rapidly in other developed countries.2
1 The number of crack initiates more than tripled between 1975 and 1979, from 30,000 to 107,000, then more than tripled 
again, to 370,000, by 1989 (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2001 National 
Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Volume III. Detailed Tables, Table 4.3A, citing the 1999, 2000, and 2001 NHSDAs).
2 On the spread of marijuana and heroin use in the 1960s, see Musto, The American Disease, pp. 247–248. The number of 
annual cocaine initiates topped out in 1983 at 1.48 million, having more than doubled since 1974, when there were 582,000 
(Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2001 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: 
Volume III. Detailed Tables, Table 4.2A, citing the 1999, 2000, and 2001 NHSDAs).30    How Goes the War on Drugs?
While we have so far in this paper drawn from published research and expert judgment, 
there is no guide to the future. If anything, stability in problems and in policy has fostered inat-
tention to the future. This inattention is reinforced by the lack of vested interests in the future 
of drug policy and problems. Politicians have short time horizons, and researchers write only 
about what their methods can address, so they say little about the policy future. Importantly, 
in the illicit-drug arena there is no legitimate industry to support the bevy of consultants who 
generate alternative futures in many other policy domains, for example, defense and energy.
In the absence of a published literature, we convened a panel of 14 drug experts from 
across the nation for a colloquium in August 2002. It was the panel’s consensus that there were 
many reasons to think drug problems and policy could change rapidly again over the next 5 to 
20 years. In summarizing some of those reasons here, we divide them into three categories:
  •  “Drivers” or factors inﬂuencing drug problems and policy, which could grow stronger or 
weaker.
  •  Assumptions about the future context that could fail.
  •  “Wild cards,” or unexpected developments that could change the course of problems and 
policy.
Note that in the following we are not attempting to forecast any one speciﬁc drug prob-
lem or policy future as the most likely. We show, instead, that there is a range of possibilities 
that may represent departures from current trends.
What Drivers Could Change in Strength?
Many factors could grow stronger or weaker in the coming years and drive problems and policy 
oﬀ their current course. Colloquium participants focused here on factors outside drug use that 
shape key aspects of it, factors whose future course seems reasonably predictable but whose ef-
fects on drug use are less obvious.
  •  Recent decades have seen a shift from communitarian, religiously based moral codes of 
conduct to individualist, secular values. This shift has inﬂuenced almost every aspect of 
the government’s role as moral arbiter; these include rules about sexual behavior, abor-
tion, and gambling. As suggested above, the shift has not extended so dramatically to 
drug control. Drug policy and problems will be strongly aﬀected by how long the drug 
exception holds out. Conversely, a general return to communitarian values could more 
ﬁrmly lock strict drug prohibition in against the eﬀects of any liberalizing trends.3
  •  Trends in the use of licit substances may aﬀect the use of illicit drugs. For example, to-
bacco use has been decreasing. Cigarette smokers are more likely to use marijuana than 
3 The shift from communitarian to individualist values is from Courtwright, “Which Sides Are You On?”How Might U.S. Drug Problems and Policies Evolve?    31
nonsmokers. If that relationship is not just coincidental, and if tobacco use keeps falling, 
marijuana use could also fall.4
  •  Some states have shown a willingness to experiment with drug policy; for example, Cali-
fornia and eight other states have allowed the cultivation of marijuana at home for medic-
inal purposes. This experimentation creates tension with the federal government. Cases 
pitting federal control against state prerogatives are beginning to come before the courts, 
and the decisions may aﬀect drug policy.5
  •  The war on terrorism could inﬂuence drug use and policy. Any terrorist attacks linked to 
the drug trade might increase the stigmatization associated with drug use. Also, greater 
attention to border control could increase the quantity of drugs seized, but large reas-
signments of interdiction resources to counterterrorist duties may take a toll on enforce-
ment pressure against traﬃckers. The evidence is mixed as to which of these eﬀects has 
predominated to date.6
  •  The globalization of trade has contributed to the availability of drugs and complicated 
their control. Lower customs barriers mean easier smuggling, and drugs are no excep-
tion to globalization’s worldwide diversiﬁcation of markets; more drugs are more globally 
available than was the case 20 years ago, and that trend can be expected to continue.7
  •  Violent crime has been associated with drug use, both in the minds of the public and 
in reality. The reduction of violent crime since the early 1990s has made it easier to talk 
about alternatives to the criminal justice approach to drug policy. If the violent-crime rate 
rebounds at the same time that “softer” approaches to drug policy are being implemented, 
there could be a backlash against such approaches.8
4 The percentage of the U.S. population currently smoking was 33.3 percent in 1979, 25.3 percent in 1990, and 23.1 percent 
in 2000 (National Center for Health Statistics [NCHS], Health, United States, 2002, p. 196, citing NCHS, National Health 
Interview Survey). In 2001, 14.9 percent of tobacco smokers reported using marijuana or hashish in the preceding 30 days, 
whereas only 2.2 percent of nonsmokers reported doing so (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
Results from the 2001 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Volume III. Detailed Tables, Table 6.7B).
5 On medical-marijuana laws and tensions between the states and the federal government, see Pacula et al., “State Medical 
Marijuana Laws,” pp. 413–439, and Ehisen, “States Keep Medical Marijuana Debate Alive.” Besides California, the eight 
states approving medical-marijuana laws permitting home cultivation are Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, 
and Maine (all by ballot measure) and Hawaii and Vermont (by the legislature). Vermont’s law was to take eﬀect on July 1, 
2004 (Allen, “State Will Legalize Medical Marijuana Use”). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently heard a case stemming from 
California’s medical marijuana law (see Greenhouse, “States Rights Defense Falters in Medical Marijuana Case”).
6 The amount of cocaine seized by Customs and Border Protection (formerly the Customs Service) fell 12.1 percent from ﬁscal 
year 2001 to 2002, and the amount of marijuana seized fell 8.6 percent; however, the amount of heroin seized rose by 14.0 
percent (U.S. Customs Service—America’s Frontline: Performance and Annual Report Fiscal Year 2002, p. 35).
7 See Stares, Global Habit, pp. 1, 27–46, 55–56.
8 When asked to rate the importance of various factors as causes of crime, 59 percent rated drug use “critical” in 2000 and 64 
percent did so in 1993—in both cases more than the percentage assigning a “critical” rating to any of eight other potential 
causes, for example, television violence, the decline of religion, poor school quality (Maguire and Pastore, eds., Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics 2000, p. 130, citing The Gallup Organization, Inc., The Gallup Poll). It has been estimated that 32 
percent of homicides, 10 percent of sexual assaults, 40 percent of aggravated assaults, and 30 percent of robberies are drug-
related (Caulkins et al., Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences, p. 183). As one metric of the ease of talking about alternatives, 
in 1998, 28 percent of Americans thought that marijuana should be legalized, up from 16 percent in 1990 (Maguire and 
Pastore, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1999, pp. 150–151, citing National Opinion Research Center, General Social 
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What Widely Maintained Assumptions Might Fail?
Drug problems and policy can track a familiar course in the future only if certain assumptions 
supporting the current trends are maintained. Some of those assumptions seem safe, such as 
a belief that the volume of legitimate cross-border trade will continue to be very large relative 
to drug smuggling, making it diﬃcult to “seal the borders.” Colloquium participants believed 
that other assumptions (phrased as questions below) that have been valid in the past are more 
vulnerable to reversal, or at least more vulnerable than is commonly assumed.
  •  Will the current “big three” illicit drugs continue to dominate drug problems? Cocaine, 
heroin, and marijuana together account for most illicit drug use in the United States and 
most of the associated crime. The price of ecstasy, however, is likely to drop, triggering 
expanded use. Likewise, if methamphetamine use in the eastern United States caught 
up to levels in the West, national methamphetamine-related crime and market revenues 
could surpass those of heroin. Either of these occurrences could stress the enforcement 
and treatment systems.9
  •  Will policy continue to treat diﬀerent illegal drugs much the same? This is an important 
issue because drugs vary greatly in the burdens they place on society. The most obvious 
candidate for diﬀerential treatment is marijuana. While laws against using and selling 
marijuana are strict in most jurisdictions, enforcement has been more lax than that for 
other drugs. If that distinction were to be codiﬁed, would marijuana be uniquely distin-
guished from the common, expensive, “hard” drugs, or would exceptions be made for 
other substances too?10
  •  Will expanded investment in drug treatment continue to be unpopular? As Alan I. Lesh-
ner, then director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, wrote in 1999, “[T]here 
are now extensive data showing that addiction is eminently treatable if the treatment is 
well-delivered and tailored to the needs of the particular patient.” However, that drug 
dependence can be treated in ways that beneﬁt the patient and, indirectly, the public at 
large, does not mean that treatment can cure the dependence the way antibiotics can cure 
an infection. Through some combination of unrealistic expectations, underappreciation 
of actual performance, and qualms about publicly funded programs whose direct beneﬁ-
9 In results from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring system, all 12 sites in which at least 10 percent of arrestees tested posi-
tive for methamphetamine use were west of the Mississippi River; seven of the eight sites in which no arrestees tested positive 
for methamphetamines were east of the Mississippi (National Institute of Justice, 2000 Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring: An-
nual Report, p. 8).
10 It has been estimated (Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug Prevention, p. 104), that 59 percent of the social costs of illicit-drug 
use are due to cocaine, 25 percent to heroin or other opiates, 9 percent to marijuana or hashish, and 7 percent to all other 
drugs. As MacCoun and Reuter argue in Drug War Heresies (p. 341), “For purposes of the legalization debate, marijuana is 
the cutting edge drug, the only politically plausible candidate for major legal change, at least depenalization and perhaps even 
outright legalization. Compared to other drugs, the harms, physiological or behavioral, are less severe, and the drug is better 
integrated into the culture. It has been used by a large share of the population at some time in their lives.” Thirty-six states 
currently classify marijuana as the federal government does, that is, as a “Schedule I” drug, or one having a high potential for 
abuse and little known medical utility. Three-quarters of the states permit a maximum of six months incarceration for posses-
sion of 10 grams of marijuana (a typical retail amount) on ﬁrst oﬀense. (These data are from ImpacTeen Illicit Drug Team, 
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ciaries are felons, treatment is still not a politically favored remedy to the drug problem. 
There is reason to believe, though, that treatment’s performance may improve in ways 
that are more obvious. Treatment modalities using depot naltrexone, immunotherapies 
and drug vaccines, buprenorphine, and contingency management hold promise. Devel-
opments such as these brighten the prospects for shifting addiction treatment into the 
medical mainstream. Should treatment quality improve, and should that improvement be 
successfully communicated to the public, its political support could increase as well.11
  •  Will political support for toughness among the public at large remain stable? It may not if 
credible options to the current regime are developed and publicized. Indeed, polls suggest 
that the public attitude toward drug policy is considerably more nuanced than are the 
statements of most politicians, at least at the federal level. Conventional wisdom holds 
that nuance does not play well on television and that hard-on-drugs sound bites are less 
risky than soft. Conceivably that could change, at least in some states.12
  •  Will racial and ethnic minorities remain divided on the question of toughness? Minori-
ties oﬀer about the same support for some aspects of drug law enforcement as whites do. 
However, there is also resentment over the number of minorities incarcerated on drug 
oﬀenses and over laws limiting the availability of housing and other beneﬁts to former 
drug oﬀenders and their families. It is diﬃcult to say how far such stresses can be pushed 
before they result in a collapse of minority support for antidrug eﬀorts.13
How Might Less Predictable Developments Play?
We have discussed reasonably predictable drivers. The world is likely to evolve in less predict-
able ways, particularly in technological terms. We here oﬀer a few plausible examples of low-
probability developments with potentially high consequences for drug problems and policy.
  •  Developments in neuroscience. It is conceivable that a scientiﬁc breakthrough will re-
sult in a medication-based drug treatment protocol that is dramatically more eﬀective 
11 For more on perceptions of addiction treatment and its limitations and promise, see McLellan et al., “Drug Dependence, a 
Chronic Medical Illness,” and Leshner, “Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment.”  On the public’s impres-
sion: In 2001, 36 percent of adult Americans judged treatment “very eﬀective” in controlling drugs, substantially fewer than 
the percentage applying that judgment to interdiction (52 percent) or domestic enforcement against sellers (49 percent) (Pew 
Research Center for the People & the Press, “Interdiction and Incarceration Still Top Remedies”). For the value of promising 
treatment modalities, see, for example, Comer et al., “Depot Naltrexone,” and Griﬃth et al., “Contingency Management in 
Outpatient Methadone Treatment.” On substance abuse treatment by physicians, see Merrill, “Integrating Medical Care and 
Addiction Treatment.” 
12 Regarding the ﬂexibility of the electorate on drug issues, about half of adult Americans believe mandatory minimum 
sentences should be rolled back, about half believe possession of small amounts of marijuana should be decriminalized, and 
three-quarters support permitting doctors to prescribe it (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Interdiction and 
Incarceration Still Top Remedies”). For the political riskiness of appearing soft on drugs, see, for example, Bertram et al., Drug 
War Politics, pp. 162–168.
13 Blacks are almost as likely as whites to agree that possession of small amounts of marijuana should be treated as a crime 
and to disagree that too many people are incarcerated for possession only (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 
“Interdiction and Incarceration Still Top Remedies”).34    How Goes the War on Drugs?
at combating addiction than those currently employed or contemplated. If addiction is 
treatable, illicit drugs could become more attractive as intoxicants, and the policy focus 
could shift from addiction to intoxication. It is also conceivable that scientiﬁc advances 
will be made or exploited by drug manufacturers, who might invent new drugs that will 
mimic the attractions of current ones without their dangers, at least in the short run.
  •  A celebrity incident. In the 1980s, Len Bias’s death focused public attention on the perils 
of cocaine and may have convinced many people who would otherwise have tried cocaine 
not to do so. Ecstasy has been enjoying a reputation as a “soft drug” much the way cocaine 
did in the 1970s. An overdose death of a celebrity, such as a pop star from a club drug, 
could change that, possibly with signiﬁcant eﬀect on initiation. Conversely, an equally 
well-known individual (or his or her child) could suﬀer grievous harm from enforcement 
action against what proved to be minor drug oﬀenses. In such a case, public support for a 
more nuanced drug policy could crystallize in a way that politicians could not ignore.14
  •  Technological progress in drug testing. A means of testing may be developed that is cheap, 
quick, and not as intrusive as urine sampling. What if, for example, the presence of drugs 
could be determined through a patch placed on the arm for a few minutes? What if the 
patch simultaneously tested for other health indicators? Such a diagnostic tool might 
prove diﬃcult for parents to resist. It might also break down some of the resistance on 
privacy grounds to widespread drug testing. This could aﬀect not only drug use, but also 
drug policy inasmuch as it shifted some sanctioning activity from the criminal justice 
system to parents and other screeners.
What Implications Does the Future Have for the Present?
Policy formulation could only beneﬁt from more attention to the future. In particular, predict-
ing what would otherwise be unpleasant surprises could be helpful by focusing attention on 
elements of drug policy or other inﬂuences that, if addressed now, could reduce the chances of 
an unwanted turn of events. For example, one might favor greater investment in prevention 
today if one anticipates a future epidemic of some new drug than if one expects just a slow 
decay to endemic levels of the current drugs.
The value of futures analysis, however, is not limited to the avoidance of unpleasant sur-
prises. By playing out speciﬁc scenarios to their ultimate consequences, policymakers could also 
identify complex issues whose eventual resolution could beneﬁt from immediate attention. For 
instance, predictions of coming conﬂict between state and federal laws suggest initiating now 
a comprehensive discussion of federalism vis-á-vis drug policy, rather than doing so piecemeal 
as aspects of this issue are raised in the courts.
More generally, everyone may be better oﬀ in the long run if the time devoted to analyz-
ing past trends and the current situation were supplemented by more anticipation of the future 
than has been the norm until now.
14 On Len Bias, see Bennett, DiIulio, and Waters, Body Count. On ecstasy’s reputation, see Cloud, “The Lure of Ecstasy.” How 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
How Should U.S. Drug Policies Evolve?
This paper aims to provide a source of information and analysis, not a detailed set of policy pre-
scriptions. We believe, however, that there are some broad principles and some narrower direc-
tions that fall naturally out of an analytic perspective and the evidence so far brought to light. 
Some of these are not likely to draw strong value-oriented objections and are thus particularly 
amenable to serving as a starting point for consensus in this fractious domain. Others may be 
challenged by vested interests or observers with a particular moral perspective but seem to us 
to be pragmatically promising enough to warrant greater consideration than they have so far 
received. Let us begin with two broad principles whose acceptance seems to us essential if drug 
control policy is ever to be eﬀective and if the debate over drug policy is to move beyond shrill 
advocacy of narrow, and thus only partial, “solutions.” (Once again, it is worth noting that no one 
is in a position to mandate the adoption of these principles, although greater emphasis in federal 
rhetoric might well prove helpful.)
Manage This Long-Term Problem for the Long Term
As we have noted, America is not going to be the world’s ﬁrst drug-free society. No crash pro-
gram or magic bullet will solve the drug problem. Instead, it is a problem that must be man-
aged so as to limit the number of people who use, the frequency or duration of their use, and 
the damage they do to themselves and others, together with the damage resulting from policy 
choices. And it is important that, in choosing strategies to address this serious problem, we 
consider the costs and beneﬁts accruing beyond the next two or four years.36    How Goes the War on Drugs?
Use All Policy Levers
This may seem too obvious to state, but we are not arguing here for rough equality of eﬀort 
over enforcement, treatment, and prevention in all situations and on all occasions. We mean, 
rather, that all approaches be considered in formulating the policy mix to address the most 
pressing problems. Two generic guidelines are relevant here.
Time the Mix of Control Strategies to the Epidemic Cycle
In particular, the allocation of eﬀort across strategies should vary as use of a drug progresses 
through the “epidemic cycle.” As discussed above, in a drug epidemic, initial low levels of use give 
way to explosive (contagious) spread, which peaks and then falls back to some endemic level.
During the explosive growth stage, policy ought to do anything and everything possible to 
delay or diﬀuse the contagion resulting from personally communicated rosy information about the 
drug. Pragmatically, enforcement is the tool most capable of having a quick eﬀect, so enforcement 
plays a uniquely valuable role. Enforcement, of course, is also a convenient rubric for a mélange 
of strategies whose suitability also varies with the situation. Early in an epidemic, it may be wisest 
to emphasize “buy-bust” stings that make retailers cautious about selling to strangers, along with 
wholesale interdiction that can create spot shortages. It makes less sense to commit resources to 
very long sentences, whose incapacitative eﬀects may extend beyond the time of crisis.1
Later in the epidemic cycle, after initiation has dropped, there is less value in deterring new 
users, keeping prices high, or seeking to constrain supply. There are more heavy users who are 
generating substantial social costs, so it makes sense to invest relatively more in treatment than 
was the case during the explosive-growth stage. Treatment includes eﬀorts both to curtail con-
sumption by dependent users and to mitigate the adverse consequences of continued use.2
Prevention programs should always be under way. Because of its long lead times, preven-
tion cannot be timed relative to an ongoing epidemic and, because its eﬀects are generic across 
substances, it might help in slowing the outbreak of the next one, whenever that might be.3
Diﬀerent drugs can be at diﬀerent points in their epidemic cycles in the same year. For ex-
ample, cocaine is now in the endemic stage; ecstasy use appears to have been growing explosively 
(see Figure 7.1). Thus, resources need not necessarily ﬂow from enforcement to treatment and 
back again. It may be more a case of directing resources to speciﬁc drugs, for example, some of the 
enforcement resources previously devoted to cocaine might now be turned to ecstasy.4 
Use the Right Tools for the Job
Aside from timing relative to epidemic stage, it is important to realize the distinctive values 
and limitations of each strategy so that each is brought to bear to the extent necessary but 
expectations stay in line with reality. Enforcement, for example, can serve well two important 
roles. First, it can make prohibition “real” by forcing market participants to “keep their heads 
1 See Caulkins, Should the U.S. Direct More Law Enforcement Eﬀort at XTC?
2 Behrens et al., “Optimal Control of Drug Epidemics: Prevent and Treat—But Not at the Same Time?”
3 Caulkins et al., An Ounce of Prevention, a Pound of Uncertainty, pp. 56–57, 86–87.
4 Caulkins, Should the U.S. Direct More Law Enforcement Eﬀort at XTC?How Should U.S. Drug Policies Evolve?    37
down.” Prohibition without enforcement invites greater drug use and harmful consequences. 
Second, enforcement can mold or shape the market into less destructive forms, even if it does 
not reduce the market’s absolute size. For example, enforcement can drive public markets into 
covert forms of operation, such as beeper sales.5
Heightened enforcement has its limits. It is relatively ineﬀective at suppressing the quan-
tity of drug consumed, and the associated crime and violence, for an established, mass-market 
drug. The reasons, discussed earlier, are largely the result of diﬀuse markets and easily replaced 
sellers. For established drugs, enforcement is generically subject to diminishing returns. That 
is, the next million dollars spent on enforcement buys less of a drop in drug consumption than 
the previous million spent. (Better returns are possible if the objective is not to decrease overall 
drug consumption but to displace local markets to other locations or forms.) Drug oﬀense in-
carcerations have increased 15-fold over the last 20 years; at some time during that expansion, 
the point of diminishing returns must have been crossed. Thus, while more enforcement may 
have looked good 20 years ago, it makes less sense now.6
5 On enforcement as a market-shaping device, see Kleiman, Against Excess, pp. 149–150.
6 In 1979, 15,539 of 274,564 state prison inmates (5.7 percent) and 5,659 of 22,201 federal prison inmates (25.5 percent) 
had been convicted on drug charges. By 2000, those numbers had grown to 251,100 of 1,206,400 state inmates (20.8 percent) 
and 73,389 of 129,329 federal inmates (56.7 percent). Data are from Brown, Flanagan, and McLeod, Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics 1983, p. 577; Flanagan, van Alstyne, and Gottfredson, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1981, p. 490; 
and Harrison and Beck, Prisoners in 2001, pp. 12–14.
Figure 7.1
Ecstasy Initiation Has Been Growing Explosively
SOURCE: SAMHSA, “2003 National Survey of Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables,” Table 4.8A, http://oas.samhsa.
gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/PDF/Sect4peTabs1to14.pdf. The two age groups shown account for most of the initiation. The 
total number of new ecstasy users across all age groups in 2001 was approximately 1.8 million, up from 200,000 in 
1993.
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Neither can much be expected of programs outside U.S. borders, which have had little 
eﬀect on U.S. drug problems. Crop eradication and substitution, in particular, show minimal 
promise. Close to the drug source, costs are so low that enforcement-induced increases are 
likely to have no observable eﬀect on street prices. The same is true of increases in the cost of 
land and labor for producing coca or opium. Obviously, there are many potentially valid rea-
sons for intervention; those might include problems in the country that are partly caused by 
U.S. drug consumption. However, it is not credible to justify an intervention principally on 
the grounds that it will reduce U.S. drug consumption.7
In contrast to enforcement, treatment can cost-eﬀectively reduce the consumption of an 
endemic drug and thus also reduce the harms associated with use. Thus, if the intent is to pro-
tect law-abiding taxpayers from drug-related crime, treatment is a cost-eﬀective way of doing so. 
Treatment is cost-eﬀective because the social costs of untreated use are enormous, but its scope is 
limited by the high rates of posttreatment relapse and by the practical diﬃculty of running heavy 
users through treatment numerous times to take advantage of their in-treatment use reductions. 
Obviously, a premium should be placed on developing new treatment methodologies (pharma-
cotherapeutic and otherwise). Research and development (R&D) is relatively inexpensive and 
could yield large returns on investments. Aside from its value to nonusers, treatment does more 
good to current users than either enforcement or prevention. Diﬀerent people will judge that 
value as of more or less worth. Some people may not attach any worth to what they may see as 
aid to transgressors of the law, or they may prefer aiding individuals who have not broken the law. 
Others may take a more tolerant view, particularly in view of a growing body of research suggest-
ing that drug addiction is not a matter of choice but of compulsion.8
Of the three principal approaches to drug control, prevention is the only one that at-
tempts to address the problem before someone gets hurt. There is little doubt that prevention 
saves society more money than it costs, and its cost-eﬀectiveness at reducing drug consump-
tion is competitive with that of some enforcement strategies. Prevention, however, is cost- 
eﬀective in no small part because it is inexpensive, not because it works like a vaccine. Preven-
tion programs should continue, but they should not be expected to make a big diﬀerence in 
the nation’s drug consumption. (Proponents of legalization hope that if money saved on en-
forcement were spent on prevention, much of the gain in use expected because of lower prices 
would be averted. That is expecting too much of prevention.)9
The strategies need not be viewed as alternatives, however. Enforcement and treatment, 
for example, can work together; in fact, as we have pointed out, they do work together, already. 
This cooperation, however, can be made more explicit and purposeful. Drug courts and other 
forms of coerced treatment use potential enforcement sanctions as an incentive to keep clients 
enrolled in treatment programs. A variant, termed “coerced abstinence,” would require proba-
tioners or parolees to test negative for drugs or face imprisonment. How the oﬀenders stayed 
clean would be up to them, but presumably, many would try treatment.10
7 On crop eradication and substitution, see Riley, Snow Job? pp. 111–131.
8 On the compulsive nature of addiction, see Leshner, “Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment.”
9 Caulkins et al., School-Based Drug Prevention, pp. 26, 35; Caulkins et al., An Ounce of Prevention, a Pound of Uncertainty, 
pp. 52–53, 74–75, 78–79.
10 Longshore et al., “Drug Courts.” On coerced abstinence, see Kleiman, “Coerced Abstinence.” How Should U.S. Drug Policies Evolve?    39
Draw Strength from Cross-State Variations in Drug Policy
As we have said, there is not a great deal of variation across states in drug policy—not nearly 
as much as there is between the United States and other countries. However, there is some. 
Within the generally prohibitionist regime, penalties vary substantially. For example, the statu-
tory minimum prison term for possession of any amount of cocaine is 6 months in Ohio and 
Texas, but 3 years in New Jersey. A few states, for example, California, mandate treatment in-
stead of incarceration for certain individuals convicted of drug use or possession. Many states 
make allowances for the medical use of marijuana, while almost as many do not. Among states 
that do, the scope and practical eﬀect of the allowances vary substantially.11
Some state policies conﬂict with the federal approach. Not surprisingly, as it has in other 
domains in which it has claimed primacy, the federal government has sought to bring states 
into line with federal policy, through means ranging from jawboning to executive orders and 
litigation. We wonder whether both federal and state policy might beneﬁt from a more ﬂexible 
federal response. While continuing to challenge egregious departures from national policy, the 
federal government might seek to learn from state variations that do not seriously undermine 
the intent of the federal strategy.12
What eﬀect such tolerable variations have in practice is unknown. There has been minimal 
eﬀort to measure the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent approaches to drug control within an enforcement- 
oriented regime. Perhaps equally as important, little is known as to whether laws that appear 
equally strict across states are actually enforced to varying degrees, either from state to state or 
from one jurisdiction to another within a state. Finally, little is known about how variations in 
the laws and enforcement practices aﬀect behavior, including drug use, the crime and disorder 
associated with drug markets, and drug-related consequences. Do people even recognize that 
they live within a stricter or more lenient jurisdiction? Under a ﬂexible approach, a strong 
emphasis would be placed on federally funded studies and data collection that would allow for 
evaluation of policy impact.
Evaluation of open questions and issues regarding variations within the prohibitionist 
regime might illuminate proﬁtable directions for national and state policy. If by following one 
approach or another, some states were making more headway against drug use and its associ-
ated harms, it is diﬃcult to see how anyone would be worse oﬀ by knowing that. It is easy 
to imagine that policy formulation and the associated debate might be moved toward more 
productive development than the current less-informed polemics can support. In this context, 
the federal government might even welcome cross-state variations in drug control policy that 
it viewed as falling within the broad scope of the national strategy.
11 Penalties are from ImpacTeen Illicit Drug Team, Illicit Drug Policies: Selected Laws from the 50 States, pp. 91, 101, 117. On 
mandatory diversion in California, see Riley et al., “Drug Oﬀenders and the Criminal Justice System.” On medical marijuana, 
see Pacula et al., “State Medical Marijuana Laws.”
12 As an example of jawboning, the George W. Bush administration was reported to have lobbied Vermont’s legislature and 
governor to reject the state’s recent medical marijuana statute (Allen, “State Will Legalize Medical Marijuana Use”). Examples 40    How Goes the War on Drugs?
Press for a More Dispassionate Debate
To conclude, we return to the spirit of our ﬁrst two guidelines and oﬀer another that is in 
the same vein but is not so much a policy suggestion as a suggestion for how to make policy. 
Even granted that drug policy is inﬂuenced by emotionally laden values, the debate has been 
remarkably polemical. And it is not just advocates of extreme positions or politicians currying 
favor with voters who have had recourse to sloganeering and sentiment. The public should ask 
that all parties to the debate concede the obvious: that children are important in our society 
and that freely available psychoactive drugs pose dangers to them. That established, the public 
should demand that the parties attend to the apparent or likely eﬀects of current or alternative 
policies on children and other Americans. They should demand as much information on eﬀects 
as they are now getting on the policies’ consistency with the moral scruples of the discussants. 
Moral preferences can conﬂict, and when they do, there is not always an easy compromise to 
be made. For people who subscribe both to values suggesting strong prohibition and to values 
more consistent with alternative approaches, knowing which policies are most eﬀective at al-
leviating the drug problem could be an important aid in decision making.41
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